# Africa AC (Elliot Version)

## Advocacy

**Plan**: Developing countries in Africa should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until checked in cross-ex. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism.

**Nelson 8** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

**Contention 1** is African Wars

### Link

Prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction is key to solving African wars.

**UNEP 9** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Since 1990 at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources. In fact, recent research suggests that over the last sixty years at least **forty percent of** all **intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources. Civil wars** such as those **in Liberia, Angola and the** Democratic Republic of **Congo have centred on** “high-value” **resources like** timber, diamonds, gold, **minerals and oil**. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water. As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, **there is significant potential for conflicts over** natural **resources to intensify in the coming decades.** In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution may aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts. Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict. Ethnicity, adverse economic conditions, low levels of international trade and conflict in neighbouring countries are all significant drivers of violence. However, the **exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of** the **conflict** cycle**, from** contributing to the **outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace.** In addition, the environment can itself fall victim to conflict, as direct and indirect environmental damage, coupled with the collapse of institutions, can lead to environmental risks that threaten people’s health, livelihoods and security. Because the way that natural resources and the environment are governed has a determining influence on peace and security, these issues can also contribute to a relapse into conflict if they are not properly managed in post-conflict situations. Indeed, preliminary findings from a retrospective analysis of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicate that **conflicts associated with** natural **resources are twice as likely to relapse** into conflict in the first five years. Nevertheless, **fewer than a quarter of peace negotiations** aiming to resolve conflicts linked to natural resources **have addressed resource management** mechanisms. The recognition that environmental issues can contribute to violent conflict underscores their potential significance as pathways for cooperation, transformation and the consolidation of peace in war-torn societies. Natural resources and the environment can contribute to peacebuilding through economic development and the generation of employment, while cooperation over the management of shared natural resources provides new opportunities for peacebuilding. These factors, however, must be taken into consideration from the outset. Indeed, deferred action or poor choices made early on are easily “locked in,” establishing unsustainable trajectories of recovery that can undermine the fragile foundations of peace. **Integrating environment** and natural resources **into peacebuilding** is no longer an option – it **is a security imperative.** The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission provides an important chance to address environmental risks and capitalize on potential opportunities in a more consistent and coherent way. In this context, UNEP recommends that the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the wider international community consider the following key recommendations for integrating environment and natural resource issues into peacebuilding interventions and conflict prevention: 1. Further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action: The UN system needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and environmental issues. At the same time, the effective governance of natural resources and the environment should be viewed as an investment in conflict prevention. 2. Improve oversight and protection of natural resources during conflicts: The international community needs to increase oversight of “high-value” resources in international trade in order to minimize the potential for these resources to finance conflict. International sanctions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources and the UN should require Member States to act against sanctions violators. At the same time, new legal instruments are required to protect natural resources and environmental services during violent conflict. 3. Address natural resources and the environment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping process: During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues that can “make or break” a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes the sharing of natural resources, including minerals, timber, land and water. It is therefore critical that parties to a peace mediation process are given sufficient technical information and training to make informed decisions on the sustainable use of natural resources. Subsequent peacekeeping operations need to be aligned with national efforts to improve natural resource and environmental governance. 4. Include natural resources and environmental issues into integrated peacebuilding strategies: The UN often undertakes post-conflict operations with little or no prior knowledge of what natural resources exist in the affected country, or of what role they may have played in fuelling conflict. In many cases it is years into an intervention before the management of natural resources receives sufficient attention. A failure to respond to the environmental and natural resource needs of the population can complicate the task of fostering peace and even contribute to conflict relapse. 5. Carefully harness natural resources for economic recovery: **Natural resources can only** help strengthen the post-war economy and **contribute to economic recovery if** they are **managed well**. The international community should be prepared to help national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. **This must go hand in hand with** ensuring accountability, transparency, and **environmental sustainability** in their management. 6. Capitalize on the potential for environmental cooperation to contribute to peacebuilding: **Every state needs** to use and protect vital natural **resources** such as forests, water, fertile land, energy and biodiversity. **Environmental issues can thus serve as an effective** platform or **catalyst for** enhancing **dialogue,** building **confidence,** exploiting shared interests **and** broadening **cooperation** between divided groups, as well as between states.

Scenario 1 is Terrorism

Oil is exacerbating South Sudan conflict now, risking civil war.

**Doki and Straziuso 13** write[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Armed rebels are said to be in control of some of South Sudan's oil fields**, raising questions of how long the country's oil will flow and whether Sudan could enter the conflict. President Salva Kiir implored his country to turn away from ethnic violence and met on Friday (local time) with foreign ministers from neighbouring states, including Kenya and Ethiopia, who flew into Juba, the capital, to help calm tensions after a week of **ethnic strife** that **is estimated to have killed hundreds**. Kiir did not speak publicly, but the government's Twitter feed attributed this quote to him: "Those who may want to take the law into their hands, the long arm of the government will get them." Fighting continued to spread on Friday in two states, Unity - an oil area - and Jonglei, as armed groups opposed to the nation's military emerged, said a South Sudan expert communicating with combatants and UN officials in strife-torn regions outside the capital. "**We've seen the conflict expand** quite **rapidly and** quite **dramatically in recent days**. We've seen the emergence of different armed groups under different commands, and we've seen the former vice president say he's not interested in talks that don't end in Salva Kiir stepping down," said Casie Copeland, South Sudan analyst for the International Crisis Group. She added that the arrival of regional foreign ministers in Juba "is genuinely a good thing." Armed opposition groups appeared to be in control of some oil fields in Unity state, she said. South Sudan's oil fields have historically been a target for rebel movements. **"The potential for oil wealth to exacerbate** the current **power struggle should not be underestimated," said** Emma **Vickers of Global Witness, a** London-based **group that investigates** and campaigns to prevent **natural resource** related **conflict**. "If rebel forces were to capture the oil fields, they could effectively hold the government to ransom." The United Nations said on Friday that 35,000 people continue to seek refuge at UN bases in three locations across the country, including 20,000 at two bases in the capital. The US Embassy had a fifth emergency evacuation flight on Friday to move Americans out of the country. British, German and Dutch planes were also scheduled to fly out. Hundreds of foreigners, including aid workers, have hurriedly left South Sudan this week at the urging of foreign embassies concerned about the possibility of out-of-control violence. Forty-five **US troops were dispatched** to Juba **earlier this week** to protect US citizens and property. A top UN official in the country, Toby Lanzer, said Friday that "difficulties" continued in Jonglei state, including the province capital, Bor, where a top military commander loyal to Machar defected from the army this week, taking his troops with him. South Sudan gets nearly 99 per cent of its government budget from oil revenues. The country reportedly earned US$1.3 billion in oil sales in just five months this year, Global Witness said. South Sudan, the world's newest country, peacefully broke away from Sudan in 2011 after decades of war and years of negotiations that former US President George W Bush invested heavily in. The south's oil flows north through Sudan's pipelines, and a rebel takeover of southern oil fields could invite Sudan into the conflict. . **Ethnic violence broke out** among South Sudan's presidential guard late on Sunday night, and fighting spread across the country over the next several days, **leading to fears of a civil war** between ethnic groups. Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, earlier this week said an attempted coup had triggered the violence, and the blame was placed on fired Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer. But officials have since said a fight between Dinka and Nuer members of the presidential guard triggered the violence. Machar's ouster from the country's No. 2 political position earlier this year had stoked ethnic tensions.

South Sudan civil war increases terrorism.

**All Africa 13** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Washington, DC — The **expanding fighting in** the Republic of **South Sudan** has killed more than 500 people in recent days and injured four U.S. military personnel who were evacuating Americans and other foreigners from the country. The conflict endangers not only citizens of that country but **threatens** to negatively impact the country’s neighbors and **the international community**, said Congressman Chris Smith (N.J.-04), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. “Already more than 500 people are reported dead,” said Smith. “More could be killed or injured, and not only in South Sudan—**the conflict may spread, threatening people in neighboring countries**. The escalating **fighting** in South Sudan **could likely lead to more terrorist activities** in an already-volatile region. The Administration’s call for a Christmas season cease-fire must be augmented by intense diplomacy with both sides.” **South Sudan**, the world’s newest nation, **borders countries** already **troubled with terror**ist activity **by the** Lord’s Resistance Army (**LRA**) **and** various **Islamic radical** and other militia **groups** in the Central African Republic, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Analysts fear that **a South Sudan** distracted and **divided by civil war would provide** an **easier operating ground** for terrorist groups. The LRA terrorist group, notorious for kidnapping children and forcing them to serve as child soldiers, still operates in the region and poses a danger to the lives of civilians in all four countries. Meanwhile, Islamic radicals have infiltrated countries in the region, most notably Somalia, but also Ethiopia and even Uganda. An unstable South Sudan will only further empower them by providing the kind of chaos in which the radicals thrive. The entire Sahel region of north-central Africa has been targeted, with Mali having been torn apart by their violent activities and nations such as Niger, Chad and Central African Republic continuing to be adversely affected by their militant and terroristic actions.

Africa resource extraction independently fuels al Qaeda influence and Africa is key.

**Dehez 5** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

One of the reasons why Africa deserves international attention is actually the war on terror. **For international terror**ist networks **Africa** is a main target; it **serves as a safe haven and** provides an effective **financial basis** with its large networks of informal economies. Africa has furthermore slowly emerged as one of the key strategic fields of international resources. The oil in the Gulf of Guinea is of major interest to the United States and Europe alike. The U.S. currently imports some 16% of its total oil imports from the African continent, Nigeria being one of its five most important oil suppliers. During the next four or five years these figures will rise substantially to some 25%. Its not only oil that is driving the interests of nations and corporations, its also other raw materials like coltan for relatively new industrial products, like mobile phones. The **rising importance of African resources for the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe is** particularly **worrying as Africa had become** what some have called **the “underbelly for transnational terror**ism**”.**2 Largely unnoticed major parts of Africa have been the scene for Islamisation since the late 1970s. It is this mixture of strategic resources, Islamisation, and state weakness that makes Africa so an inviting target for terrorism and terrorist networks. Terrorism in Africa The fact that terrorism has emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the West was by no means a surprise. Back in 1995 the NATO Secretary General Willy Claes warned: The threat by fundamental Islam in Africa has to be taken seriously. “Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western Security.”3 In sub-Saharan Africa Islam has advanced significantly in the last couple of years. Some analysts fear that Niger may break up; into a Muslim dominated North and a Christian dominated South. Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal also have strong Muslim minorities.4 Some analysts go as far as claiming that there are already centres of Islam in Africa, considering the tropical zone along the Gulf of Guinea, the Sudanese Nile region and the East African coastal strip as such centres of Islam.5 There are strong Muslim minorities in Mocambique, Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, Burkina, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. In some other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Islam is already a majority religion: Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia.6**In Nigeria** for instance some **twelve provinces introduced** the **Shari’a** as basic law **and** Osama **bin Laden called it one of the countries he wanted to “liberate”. Somalia serves a safe haven for terror**ist **groups** like Al-Itihaad al-Islamyia, which is **linked to Al-Qaeda.** This particular terrorist cell is held responsible for the attacks on U.S. soldiers during the U.N. mission Restore Hope, which left 18 U.S. soldiers dead and about 75 wounded.8 Islam is one index of identity, alongside ethnicity and regional loyalties and so far African Islam has been relatively moderate. But as David McCormack recently pointed out, African Islam is slowly turning into Islamism in Africa.9 In West Africa one of the major reasons for the instability of the coastal strip and its countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia is the divison into a Christian dominated South and a Muslim dominated North. More aggressive interpretations of Islam are promoted by Saudi Arabia and Iran, through building of mosques, financial support for the hajj and the provision of education. The presence of the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youths in East Africa has had a radicalising influence on the local population.10 The threat by fundamentalist Islam in Africa has to be taken seriously. Three years before 9/11, Africa was targeted by Al-Qaeda. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi caused 224 casualties, including 12 Americans. Since 1996 the number of international terrorist incidents in Africa increased dramatically. While in 1996 eleven incidents had been reported, the number exploded to fifty-five incidents in 2000.11 Although Africa is comparatively less effected by international terrorism (although it experienced some of the bloodiest attacks)12 that does not indicate that it deserves less attention. Quite on the contrary, it should be one of the major focuses in the struggle against terrorism. The core problems the international community has to face on the African continent are: ungoverned parts of Africa, especially in failed states, which often serve as safe haven for terrorists and other states that serve as transit hubs to the Middle East, like Kenya, conditions of conflict that may lead to more alienation from traditional identities and thus providing breeding ground for more radical forms of Islam, that nearly 40% of Africa's total population are already Muslim, while a more fundamentalist version of Islam is promoted with financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Iran, that widespread guerilla warfare might turn into urban terrorism,13 that informal economic structures might serve as an ideal environment to money laundering,14 and finally that Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), donors, and other western institutions might provide an easy and inviting target for international terrorism.15 Given this background one might wonder, why Africa did not experience more terrorist attacks in the past.16 The main reason is that failing states provide a suitable environment for sub-national terrorism. But sub-national terrorism does not count as international terrorism, that has, per defintionem, to affect more than one country.17 While weak and failed states with their lack of territorial control make it easier for opposition movements or potential terrorist organisations to seize power. Groups that do not have the ability to control territory – as is the case in most countries in the Middle East – tend to terrorist strategies. But as long as these opposition groups maintain territorial areas of control they do not tend to terrorist attacks; they prefer what some analysts label guerilla warfare.18 Guerilla warfare is by no means less brutal than other forms of terrorism, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone proved that their guerilla warfare is indeed yet another form of terrorism. The African Union's regional instrument to counter terrorism is the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism established in 1999.19 It defines terrorism as a form of international crime: a result of the fact that Africa serves as a suitable and ideal environment to finance terror. **African states realised** back to **two years before 9/11 that terror**ism **exploits** the **differences in governance, porous borders, and illegal** and informal **trade** networks.20After the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1373.21 This resolution was binding and called for the suppression of the recruitment, financing and supply of terrorist networks (although many African governments committed themselves to the war on terror, they lack the means to effectively do so). In the same resolution the United Nations Security Council was aware that one of the major problems is the connection between terrorism and international organised crime. This especially concerned Africa, where drugs and arms trafficking and informal economic structures are prelevant.22 Strategic Resources and International Terrorism Africa with its huge networks of informal economy is furthermore a suitable environment for terrorist groups to finance themselvs. There are rumours that Al-Qaeda profited from the informal economic structures in Africa. Although there is not yet enough evidence, many analysts think its plausible that Al-Qaeda was involved in the diamonds trade in Sierra Leone and in gems trafficking in Tanzania, thus prolonging tensions and conflicts.23 Some observers even argue that Al-Qaeda owned up to nearly 15 vessels for any kind of transport, using Somalia as an operational basis. Additionally there are also reports that Al-Qaeda was involved in Gold smuggling from Pakistan to Sudan.24 **What makes Africa so** attractive and **vulnerable to terrorists** and international crime **is its resources**. Especially in West Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea are vast amounts of oil. Gold, iron ore, bauxite, diamonds, and uranium attract not only big western companies but also illegal and informal entrepreneurs. In Central Africa gold, iron, oil, diamonds do the same; coltan is also available, which is especially important for those industries producing mobile phones and other electronic equipment.25 As the United States want to increase the African part of their oil supplies, more attention will be drawn to Nigeria, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tomé e Principe.26 Some 25% of overall U.S. oil imports will come from Africa within the next four or five years.27 But the security sector in Africa is weak and on-shore as well as off-shore oil production is a very inviting target, especially in Nigeria. In the past mineral resources played a key role in financing civil war and different militias. Illegal diamond trade was a major source to finance the war between the Angolan government and the UNITA.28 The instability in the Democratic Reublic of Congo is largely due to the attractiveness of a vast amount of mineral resources in the region. Their illegal exploitation is a central way of financing for different milita groups in the whole country. One central precondition of illegal expoliatiation are porous borders. The smuggling of diamonds and other raw materials across the borders in central Africa is a key obstacle to freedom and peace in the region. As long as illegal trade is that simple providing stability in the region will be very difficult even for democratic states; and missions to provide stability in the region are designated to fail, as attacks on MONUC soldiers in the province of Ituri in early 2005 showed. It therefore must be of a key priority to Europeans and Americans alike to maintain more control over Africa's economy and to promote more border control by the African state authorities. A Change in Policies? After 9/11 the United States reviewed its foreign and development policy. One basic conclusion was that **despite** all international **aid** and financial injections **most** development **countries in Africa** simply **did not experience development**. The National Security Strategy set up in 2002 was the first attempt to counter that challenge. No development in development countries however did not suggest that development aid was futile, but rather that development aid had to be conducted in a different way. The new National Security Strategy marked the first time, when the United States began to take the threat of failed and weak states serious. The U.S. tried to tackle the issue and committed itself to more development aid but at the same time made it part of their National Security Agenda. **Development policy since has a goal: Improving security for the U**nited **S**tates **and their allies**. It was no longer a senseless expenditure to prove the selflessness of Western nations but was turned into an important mean of foreign and security affairs and thereby giving it a much higher priority in overall political affairs. However until now this change has only been rhetoric. State failure and state weakness in Africa is still a widespread problem. Somalia is an outstanding case in this regard. It experienced a military coup d’etat in the early postcolonial period, was an ally to both the Soviet Union and the United States, entered a bloody civil war, followed by international intervention and withdrawal and the secession of a major part of the country, of what is now called Somaliland. But renewed efforts by the African Union and the regional body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) go without significant support of the United States. State failure is an imminent threat in other African countries as well, as in Nigeria and Eritrea.29 There is a whole volatile region from Liberia to Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea where state failure is a common threat, thus preparing a potential breeding ground for terrorism in the medium future. But despite the rising significance of these regions for their natural resources initiatives to promote peace, stability and democracy have been limited. Although after 9/11 the United States released a new doctrine– the U.S. now considers Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia as key countries of their interest in Africa – in the very same doctrine the United States stated that no U.S. troops will be dispatched to the African continent in peacekeeping missions.30 The same goes for the G8 countries: Although they have recognised that “Sustained and better co-ordinated support for the African Peace and Security Architecture and for post-conflict is required”31, they have not yet allocated the necessary financial support nor have they increased their diplomatic activity.

Terrorism is the most likely existential threat. **Rhodes 9**[[6]](#footnote-6)

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005.

This group of **85 experts judged that** the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real and increasing over time**. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. **There was strong**, though not universal, **agreement that** a **nuclear attack is more likely** to be carried out **by a terrorist organization than by a government.** The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations will face an existential threat** from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike** on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely **initiat[ing]**e **a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Scenario 2 is AIDS

Studies confirm. Resource extraction causes African war and poverty.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Within Figure 1 the number of wars in Africa is highlighted. The trend of rising prevalence throughout the Cold War and a decrease thereafter is similar for African countries. There are two peaks in the African series, 1991/1992 with eight and 1989 with nine wars. Since then the number of wars has fallen to two in 2006. If one takes into consideration that only about 12 percent of the global population live in Africa1 , it seems that **Africa has experienced more violent conflict than other continents. African wars have also lasted longer**, on average they lasted about eight years while the global average is about six and a half years.2 The question why Africa has seen more wars has been examined by a number of scholars. Colonial history and proxy wars throughout the Cold War are often at the core of the argument. Most of this amounts to an African ‘exceptionalism’, in other words Africa’s troubled past is Africa specific and cannot be analysed in the same way as wars in other parts 1 Based on population data for 2000, data source: WDI 2007, author’s calculation. 2 Data source: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, author’s calculation. of the world. However, a **global statistical analysis** of the onset of civil wars **suggests that Africa has experienced more civil wars** mainly **because** the economic circumstances, low income, low growth and **high dependence on natural resources**, have **made war feasible** (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Taking these factors into consideration Africa has not experienced more wars than the continent’s characteristics would predict. In addition the **wars in Africa have** also **resulted in** making the continent poorer and **preventing development** in many countries. **This cycle of poverty and war has been described** as **a ‘conflict trap’** (see for example Collier, 2007). If colonial and Cold War history are the main causes of this trap there is not much hope for the future since we cannot change history. **If** on the other hand **economic factors are important determinants of conflict risk** (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2007) **there is hope that the future will not look like the past**. Since the 1990s Africa has seen a reduction in the prevalence of civil war and countries with long and devastating civil wars are now at peace. Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda are such examples. Countries suffer from many different consequences of civil war. Wars kill people in many different ways: civilians and soldiers are killed in combat, people die because there is a higher prevalence of preventable communicable diseases and during wars people are killed due to increased violent crime. Wars force mass migration. Post-war economies are in a worse shape than before the warand far from bringing an improvement to the political system, in general post-war societies are less democratic (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007a). **Countries with a violent past** also **face** a **high risk of renewed conflict, about 40 percent of countries experience a new civil war within a decade** (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). Dealing with the consequences of war is not only a humanitarian imperative but dealing with the economic and political consequences is also important because it decreases the risk of the civil war breaking out again. Dealing with the consequences of civil wars is our chance of ‘breaking the conflict trap’.

African war and poverty cause AIDS spread.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

**One disease that affects Africa disproportionately is** HIV/**AIDS.** Buvé, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza and Mutangadura (2002) provide an overview of the spread and effect of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa.4 By the end of 2001 the HIV prevalence rate in adults in the region was estimated at 8.4 percent. Estimated prevalence rates for other regions were much lower, the Caribbean region has the second highest prevalence rate of 2.2 percent and all other regions have prevalence rates of less than 1 percent. The discussion of **why Africa is more severely affected than any other region** focuses on two explanations**: war and poverty.** Wars are conducive to the rapid spread of HIV. **Soldiers are facing** the risk of losing their lives and weigh up **the risk of contracting HIV by stressful situations and dangers** related to war. **Civilians are often subjected to** human rights abuses, including **sexual violence.** In Rwanda in 1995 the prevalence of HIV in pregnant women from rural areas was 24 percent which was attributed to rape during the genocide. Some **women** find themselves **in** abject **poverty** that **may** lead them to **use commercial sex to survive.** In general displacement during war weakens social cohesion and relationships which may lead to promiscuity and commercial sex. Poverty is also cited as a reason for the high prevalence rates. **Sexual behaviour patterns are more risky when people are poor.** Poverty also seems to increase the gender imbalance. Although women are more at risk of contracting HIV it seems that they cannot demand condom use from their partners. Buvé, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza and Mutangadura (2002) conclude that **populations in many part of Africa are becoming trapped in a vicious HIV-poverty cycle.** HIV/AIDS leads to high mortality rates among the young and economically productive, thus leading to further impoverishment. **Until the problem of** economic **development is tackled and socio-economic circumstances for young people change, it is difficult to persuade them to adapt their sexual behaviour** to secure their future. In addition to physical diseases war leaves people traumatised. Most of the victims of civil war are civilians and they are subjected to or witness war-related traumatic events such as shootings, killings, rape, torture and loss of family members. A random household survey of residents and internally displaced persons in Freetown in 1999 showed that almost every respondent was exposed to conflict. Fifty percent of the respondents lost someone to whom they were very close, 41 percent actually witnessed their death. Torture was witnessed by 54 percent, executions by 41 percent, amputations by 32 percent and public rape by 14 percent. The witnessing of such events can lead to serious psychological stress. The health services in post-conflict countries are poorly functioning. Medical staff are facing huge problems of physical diseases they have no or very little resources to address post-traumatic stress disorder.5 **War ruins a country’s economy, including the health sector**. Devastated by the war **the post-conflict government has got insufficient revenues to spend on** the **health** sector which faces enormous demand. At the same time **donors are** often **reluctant to fund improvements** in the health sector **before they can be certain that peace can be sustained.** Wakabi (2007) provides an overview of Burundi’s health sector post-conflict. Maternal mortality rates are at 1,000 per 100,000 live births and infant mortality at 114 per live births. These rates are among the highest in Africa. Other diseases, such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and HIV/AIDS have claimed 300,000 lives since 2003. Less than half the population have access to safe drinking water.

AIDS spread in Africa goes global, risking nuclear civil wars.

**USAID 6** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

As Atwood notes, HIV is much more than a social or developmental threat — it is a concrete threat to stability and security. Nelson Mandela, in a speech before the World Economic Forum in 1997, hinted of the potential for conflict and instability to emerge when a people realize that their government is unable to meet their needs when he noted that, “South Africans are beginning to understand the cost [of HIV/AIDS] … observing with growing dismay its impact on the efforts of our new democracy to achieve the goals of reconstruction and development.” In addition to eroding the link between people and their government, infectious epidemics have a more pernicious ability to pit people against each other within societies. As the resource base begins to shrink, competition among surviving groups for access to and control over the levers of power and influence increases. This competition often results in social and political fragmentation and ethnic, racial or socio-economic conflict. David Gordon of the United States National Intelligence Council, one of the first policy analysts to recognize the connection between health and security, noted in his ground-breaking 2000 “National Intelligence Estimate” the potential for intra-state conflict resulting from epidemic disease. Gordon noted that, “[t]he severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases … and the infiltration of these diseases into ruling political and military elites and middle classes of developing countries are likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce state resources.” **The global nature of the threat** HIV/**AIDS** represents **becomes** immediately **clear when we** pause to **remember how interconnected and mobile** we all **are.** Richard Holbrooke, the former United States ambassador to the United Nations, warned members of the Security Council in 2000 that, “if it [HIV/AIDS] is not dealt with, it will clearly wreck the economies of Africa and the subcontinent. [AIDS] will spread; **you can’t draw a wall around Africa and commit continental triage.**” Indeed, **HIV is spreading** daily — **hourly** — **reaching epidemic levels** of infection **throughout the developing world.** While currently concentrated primarily in sub- Saharan Africa, the disease is already emerging as a security threat in other countries, including some thought of as economically well-developed. Peter Piot, director of UNAIDS, has commented: “We have every reason to assume that the epidemic in Southeast Asia will soon be just as widespread as it is in Africa, and that East **Africa’s experience** — a slowdown of its economy — **will be replicated in Eastern Europe** and the developing countries of **Asia and Latin America.”** UNAIDS, the main advocate for global action on the epidemic, is tasked with preventing transmission of HIV, providing care and support, reducing the vulnerability of individuals and communities to HIV/AIDS, and alleviating the impact of the epidemic. **A recent study by** the **C**enter for **S**trategic and **I**nternational **S**tudies **identified five nations as the “Next Wave,” ripe for an explosion of HIV** infection rates **rivaling** those of **sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria and Ethiopia** (together representing over a quarter of that already ravaged continent’s population), **Russia, China and India. The last three nations**, which collectively contain close to a third of the Earth’s population, **are all nuclear-armed countries beset with** ethnic and **social strife and burdened by** economic and political **pressures that threaten to erupt into internal conflict.** The addition of HIV/**AIDS, with its demonstrated ability to disrupt society** at all levels**, will** only **increase** the **potential for regional conflict and instability.**

Scenario 3 is the Congo River Basin

African resource wars cause destruction of the Congo River Basin.

**Sites 4** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**In the Congo River Basin, conflict** has been a recurring nuisance for the development of several countries. Natural resources play a significant role in feeding conflicts, many of which **involve securing control and access to natural resources. Communities and forests pay the price**. Wars in the Congo River Basin involve groups of combatants that are always on the move, gaining temporary control over towns and settlements, but who are almost never able to subdue the surrounding areas. The constant movement of militias and the unpredictability of their actions have a devastating impact on human lives. Estimates of war-related deaths in eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) range from 3.3 million to 4.5 million. To avoid conflict, refugees and displaced rural populations avoid major roads and move into the forests and protected areas, where they are less likely to encounter soldiers and rebels.1 How natural resources fuel war Natural resources such as timber, as well as other commodities such as diamonds, all play roles in motivating these wars because of their characteristics (accessibility, weight-to-value ratios and the ability to loot, conceal and sell them later)2. In the DRC, rebel groups, government troops and their foreign allies have used the country’s diamonds, gold, timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt to pay for their war-related expenses.3 Perpetuating conflict… A United Nations panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources of the DRC recently stated that "**illegal exploitation remains one of the main sources of funding for groups involved in perpetuating conflict**". According to the panel, neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe have all helped themselves to the DRC's gold, diamonds, timber and coltan; systematically stripping factories, farms and banks in the process.4 What are the impacts of conflict? A breakdown in the rule of law and other controls during and immediately after conflicts. Mass movements of people and human rights abuses. Decline in agricultural production, trade and food availability as conditions become unsafe to carry out such activities and transport is disrupted. Increased dependence on wild natural resources (such as bushmeat) for survival when other livelihoods are made impossible: As refugees seek means to sustain themselves away from their home areas and hold their families together, **they often invade poorly protected areas** in search of housing materials, bush foods and products that they can sell. Protected areas also often contain more wildlife than other areas and can thus provide a ready supply of meat for rebels or small armies. Moreover, when it becomes too dangerous for the staff in protected zones to continue patrols, **the frequency of illegal** mining of gold and diamonds, hunting for ivory and bushmeat, **felling of timber** and agricultural encroachment often **increases**.5

The Congo River Basin is extremely vital to the environment, and its destruction ensures extinction.

**Boukongou 5** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

This is not a revival of “good savage” ideology which is useful for the “civilized world,” but it is simply a matter of understanding that **the forests of the Congo basin is the entire humanity’s precious “lung.”** Beyond the traditional quarrels1 of the sycophants of environmental protection and the relevance of advocated public programs2, one notices the intensification of multilateral initiatives, which try to respond both to the stakes of protecting the Congo basin as well as to the challenge of preserving life on Earth. Nevertheless, even the advocates of sustainable development cannot forget that “bio-humanity” is a naturally complex vision of society. As far as one can go back in time, and on the principle of the divine message, man will always return to nature. This implies an organization and structuralization of spaces, which cannot be strictly limited to the protection of the fauna and flora. Consequently, international concern about the ecosystem of the Congo basin is neither the result of sudden philanthropy, nor the outcome of triumphant environmentalism. The region is a dynamic geopolitical area, where forests are a source of oil and conflicts. I think that it is fundamental not to separate the issue of forests from the less media-covered question of the rich oil and mineral resources in the hinterland and maritime zones of Central Africa. The predators are in the forests and on the political scene, and they are searching for democratic legitimacy3. Thus, I’m calling for combining the “green” debate with the “political” debate in order to promote better governance of the geopolitical basin of the Congo, give rise to concrete and multilateral awareness of the problems of Central Africa which aren’t only environmental but also political. It is a matter of emphasizing political and civil implications, on one hand, and legal instruments and institutional frameworks, on the other, in order to assure a better progressive transition in Central Africa from “Black governance” (in other words, oil-based governance) to “green governance”. A Geopolitical Basin The geographic entity called the “Congo basin” includes territories extending from the end of the Sahelian areas of Chad and Sudan and the edge of the plains along the Zambezi. The voluntarily extensive vision of this basin challenges the thesis that this forest area is confined to narrow post-colonial zones in Central African States, which doesn’t challenge the principles of international law relating to boundaries. **This basin is a vast forest area that covers** approximately 2,300,000 sq. km., or **26 percent of the world’s rainforests**4. **The forests are well known for their exceptional biodiversity** and contribute, in an important way, to countering the greenhouse effect by absorbing the carbon dioxide which is emitted into the atmosphere5. **This is the natural environment of more than half of the world’s wildlife and vegetable species**. Some consider it the compost of numerous diseases, such as the terrible Ebola fever.The Congo basin regroups several countries (Cameroon, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola and Chad), which form (with Sao Tome e Principe) the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). On the one side, one may identify the Congo basin area itself to the ECCAS, and on the other, consider it as the logical construction of a regional area where sustainable governance of ecosystems should contribute, via the mobility of people, to economic links and ecological flows, to restoring and strengthening peace. One must remember that during the Millenium Summit held in New York in 2000 the Heads of State and Government declared their intention not to spare “any effort in order to assure that the entire humanity, and especially our children and grandchildren, will not live on a planet irreversibly degraded by human activities whose resources can no longer meet their requirements6.” This appeal is in line with the dynamics of building the concept of sustainable development, advocated by the UICN7 in 1980 and resumed in the Bundtland report in 19878. States have to cooperate in a spirit of world partnership in order to preserve, protect and restore the integrity of the ecosystem. Of course, according to Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 1514 (XV)9 of the United Nations General Assembly and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, “States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources according to their environment and development policies.” In other words, they can implement their proper environmental policies. But these actions do not produce concrete effects. The degradation of the environment and certain natural or industrial disasters directly affect the Earth as a continuous portion of space. It is only on this scale that adequate initiatives can be taken in order to obtain durable and adequate results. International CooperationActually, environmental protection has become one of the most important issues in contemporary world relations. International cooperation is necessary to protect humanity’s common heritage. No country can do it on its own, because this is a common responsibility. Therefore, the quality of air and the atmosphere depends on world coordination in many domains. The protection of the quality of the waters of a boundary river, or of a lake common to several countries, requires international coordination and cooperation. As the International Court of Justice reminded in the case Gabcikovo-Nagymaros: “During ages, man did not stop influencing nature for economic and other purposes. In the past it often accomplished this without taking into account the effects on the environment. Due to the new horizons opened by science and the increasing awareness of the risks of these interventions for humanity – whether it is for the present or for future generations – new standards and requirements have been put in place, enounced in a substantial number of instruments over the past two decades. These new standards must be taken in consideration and these new requirements appropriately appreciated, not only when States envisage launching new activities, but also when they pursue projects that have already been launched. The concept of sustainable development expresses the need for reconciling economic development and environmental protection10.” Since the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 the pressure exercised by NGOs and the international financial backers prompted governments to adjust their institutional frameworks and to work out coherent policies, in particular environmental action plans relating to the national, regional and international dimension. At the sub-regional level, such initiatives led to setting up mechanisms and processes such as the Conference of Ministers for Forests of Central Africa (COMIFAC)11, Conference on Central Africa’s Moist Forest Ecosystem (CEFDHAC) and the Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Process (AFLEG)12. Organized in March, 1999 in Yaoundé, the summit of leaders of Central African States on the conservation and sustainable management of rain forests confirmed the Rio commitment to lead common policies for sustainable management of forested ecosystems. This regional dynamics led to the elaboration and adoption of a “convergence plan” for the Congo basin, whose main objective is the “conservation, restoration, development and durable use of biologic resources in the framework of management adapted to the social and cultural economic development of populations and the protection of the global environment13.” This convergence plan covers a ten-year period (2004-2013 and will globally cost an estimated US$ 1.5 billion, or 840 billion CFA Francs14. Regional dynamics led to international participation in efforts to respond to this universal concern, and the Johannesburg summit on sustainable development in September 200215 paved the way to a multilateral initiative: the United States of America and South Africa inspired, along with many other actors, the idea of a multilateral partnership for the protection of forests in **the Congo basin. Considered as the left lung of the earth, these forests are** a vegetable and wildlife reserve **inextricably bound to human life**16. According to Walter Kansteiner, **they are a “world treasure,” a “world lung” necessary for preserving biologic diversity**.

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[12]](#footnote-12)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[13]](#footnote-13) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

## So Many Contingent Standards

Underview – Environment impacts come first.

Environmentalism precedes ethics. 3 reasons.

A. Western ethics can’t escape the tragedy of the commons. **Elliott 3** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

As I pointed out in A General Statement of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons (Vol.18, No.6, July, 1997 of Population and Environment), Hardin's essay is not making factual claims. It is not recommending any specific moral theory. Rather it is a thought experiment. And the purpose of a **thought experiment** i**s** to **bring to light the contradictions** with**in a system of thought.** Hardin's thought experiment proves that if people do what is right or good according to **established moral principles**, they can in fact cause great harm; they **can destroy** the commons - **the environment** - **that sustains moral life.** In this seminal essay, **Hardin proves the** tragic **error** implicit **both in individual**ism **and** in the **philanthropic**, human-centered **ethics** which people in the Western nations commonly assume to be the final moral truth.

**The** fact that a **tragedy of the commons** is possible **proves that a factual state-of-affairs can refute a moral theory.** In effect, **it proves the falsity of the methodological assumptions on which Western ethics is founded, namely, that reason and** valid **a priori arguments** and/or the infallible revelations of God **justify moral laws** and principles. Consequently a priori reasoning and non-empirical arguments do not suffice to justify moral beliefs. **Knowledge of moral laws** and principles is not a priori knowledge. It cannot be certain; it **cannot be universal** in scope; it cannot be invariant under changing circumstances. Henceforth the rules of correct moral conduct must pass environmental and factual tests. **Nature can veto moral** beliefs and **theories.**

B. Ecology is a prerequisite to ethics. **Elliott 3** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

An **ethics** capable of being practiced **in a finite world must be founded on the moral obligation never to cause the environment to break down. This** obligation **stipulates a necessary condition for moral life.** It can be stated as the environmental principle, namely, to preserve the endurance and the resilience of the earth's system of living things. This principle cannot be justified by appeals to reason or the infallible revelations of God. It cannot be justified by valid inferences from human-centered definitions and universal moral principles. And **it is not subject to** scholarly **rebuttal by professionals in moral philosophy. Rather, it is a factual necessity. Any ethics which denies the environmental principle is doomed to fail. People who live by an ethics which denies it simply die out.** In effect, **the moral certainty of the environmental principle is proved by the absurdity of its denial.**

C. A priori reason fails; it’s premised on a speciesist bias. **Elliott 3** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

**A priori thinking** in ethics **is** a kind of **species narcissism. It is** an instance of **the hubris of rationalism to believe that the human mind creates** or determines **moral reality. By contrast, the contingent character of empirical knowledge requires that human beings be humble before the facts. People can only rearrange events in the world according to the laws** and limits **of nature. The empirical constraints** that apply **to engineering** and architecture **apply to ethics as well.** People can only make ethical proposals; nature either tolerates or denies their proposals.

But, if ethics comes first, adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks.

**Bostrom 9** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

## Theory Preempts

1. Err aff on theory. There was a 5% neg side bias at Strake Jesuit based on prelims and elims according to Joy of Tournaments. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

2. Case outweighs theory. Students’ analyzing environmental issues is critical for sustainable solutions. This must be coupled with policy advocacy to succeed.

**Cotgrave and Alkhaddar 06**[[19]](#footnote-19)

Environmental education Many writers have determined that **the main aim of environmental education is to change attitudes, that will in turn change behaviour**. As long ago as 1976, Ramsey and Rickson identified that it has long been known that the basis for many environmental problems is irresponsible behaviour. Without a doubt, one of the most important influences on behaviour is attitude, that in turn is influenced by education. Campbell Bradley et al. (1999) stress the need for trying to change young people’s environmental attitudes because young people ultimately will be affected by, and will need to provide, solutions to environmental problems arising from present day actions. **As future policymakers, the youth** of today **will be responsible for ‘fixing’ the environment** **and they will be the ones who must be persuaded to act now** in order to avoid paying a high price to repair damage to the environment in the future, if indeed it is repairable. Therefore it appears that effective environmental education, which changes the attitudes of young people, is crucial. The (then) Department for Education (DFE) report, commonly known as the ‘Toyne Report’ (DFE, 1993), concluded that **as education seeks to lead opinion, it will do so more effectively if it keeps in mind the** distinctive nature of **its mission,** which is first and foremost **to improve** its **students’ understanding**. Their concern may well be awakened as a result; but it must be a properly informed concern. This does not necessarily mean treating the environment as a purely scientific issue, but does mean that the respective roles of science and ethics need to be distinguished, and the complexities of each need to be acknowledged. Failure to do this may lead all too readily to an ‘environmentalism’ which, by depicting possibilities as certainties, can only discredit itself in the long run and feed the complacency which it seeks to dispel. McKeown-Ice and Dendinger (2000) have identified the fact that scientific knowledge and political intervention will not solve the environmental problem on their own, thus implying that something additional is required to change behaviour. As has already been discussed, behaviour changes can only occur if attitudes change and this can be achieved through education. As Fien (1997) identifies, environmental education can play a key role by creating awareness, and changing people’s values, skills and behaviour. Introducing environmental elements into the curriculum can therefore be seen as a potentially effective way of transferring knowledge. This should in turn improve attitudes that will lead to improvements in environmental behaviour. Graham (2000) believes that it is crucial that building professionals not only participate in the creation of projects that have low environmental impact, but equally it is important that they learn to conceive, nurture, promote and facilitate the kind of paradigm changes seen as necessary to create a sustainable society. **There are** however **limitations as to what education can achieve on its own**, for as Jucker (2002) believes, **if we do not** do everything we can to **transform our political**, economic and social **systems** into more sustainable structures, **we might as well forget the educational part.**

3. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory, killing substantive education. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

4. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

5. Debating specific nuclear scenarios is key to stave off actual nuclear war.

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. **Nuclear war cannot be avoided** simply **by refusing to think about it.** Indeed the task of **reducing** the likelihood of **nuclear war should begin with** an effort to **understand[ing] how it might start. When strategists in Washington** or Moscow **study** the possible origins of **nuclear war, they discuss “scenarios,”** imagined sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity’s fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But imaginary as they are, **nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet** prevented because they have not been **foreseen.**

# AC for Hockaday

## Advocacy

“Developing countries” is defined as countries with low per capita GDP, as per the World Bank.

**Plan**: Developing countries in Africa should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until she checks in cross-ex. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

## Theory Preempts

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 8** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows her to moot the AC.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. She’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

**Contention 1** is African Wars

### Link

Prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction is key to solving African wars.

**UNEP 9** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

Since 1990 at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources. In fact, recent research suggests that over the last sixty years at least **forty percent of** all **intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources. Civil wars** such as those **in Liberia, Angola and the** Democratic Republic of **Congo have centred on** “high-value” **resources like** timber, diamonds, gold, **minerals and oil**. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water. As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, **there is significant potential for conflicts over** natural **resources to intensify in the coming decades.** In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution may aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts. Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict. Ethnicity, adverse economic conditions, low levels of international trade and conflict in neighbouring countries are all significant drivers of violence. However, the **exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of** the **conflict** cycle**, from** contributing to the **outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace.** In addition, the environment can itself fall victim to conflict, as direct and indirect environmental damage, coupled with the collapse of institutions, can lead to environmental risks that threaten people’s health, livelihoods and security. Because the way that natural resources and the environment are governed has a determining influence on peace and security, these issues can also contribute to a relapse into conflict if they are not properly managed in post-conflict situations. Indeed, preliminary findings from a retrospective analysis of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicate that **conflicts associated with** natural **resources are twice as likely to relapse** into conflict in the first five years. Nevertheless, **fewer than a quarter of peace negotiations** aiming to resolve conflicts linked to natural resources **have addressed resource management** mechanisms. The recognition that environmental issues can contribute to violent conflict underscores their potential significance as pathways for cooperation, transformation and the consolidation of peace in war-torn societies. Natural resources and the environment can contribute to peacebuilding through economic development and the generation of employment, while cooperation over the management of shared natural resources provides new opportunities for peacebuilding. These factors, however, must be taken into consideration from the outset. Indeed, deferred action or poor choices made early on are easily “locked in,” establishing unsustainable trajectories of recovery that can undermine the fragile foundations of peace. **Integrating environment** and natural resources **into peacebuilding** is no longer an option – it **is a security imperative.** The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission provides an important chance to address environmental risks and capitalize on potential opportunities in a more consistent and coherent way. In this context, UNEP recommends that the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the wider international community consider the following key recommendations for integrating environment and natural resource issues into peacebuilding interventions and conflict prevention: 1. Further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action: The UN system needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and environmental issues. At the same time, the effective governance of natural resources and the environment should be viewed as an investment in conflict prevention. 2. Improve oversight and protection of natural resources during conflicts: The international community needs to increase oversight of “high-value” resources in international trade in order to minimize the potential for these resources to finance conflict. International sanctions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources and the UN should require Member States to act against sanctions violators. At the same time, new legal instruments are required to protect natural resources and environmental services during violent conflict. 3. Address natural resources and the environment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping process: During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues that can “make or break” a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes the sharing of natural resources, including minerals, timber, land and water. It is therefore critical that parties to a peace mediation process are given sufficient technical information and training to make informed decisions on the sustainable use of natural resources. Subsequent peacekeeping operations need to be aligned with national efforts to improve natural resource and environmental governance. 4. Include natural resources and environmental issues into integrated peacebuilding strategies: The UN often undertakes post-conflict operations with little or no prior knowledge of what natural resources exist in the affected country, or of what role they may have played in fuelling conflict. In many cases it is years into an intervention before the management of natural resources receives sufficient attention. A failure to respond to the environmental and natural resource needs of the population can complicate the task of fostering peace and even contribute to conflict relapse. 5. Carefully harness natural resources for economic recovery: **Natural resources can only** help strengthen the post-war economy and **contribute to economic recovery if** they are **managed well**. The international community should be prepared to help national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. **This must go hand in hand with** ensuring accountability, transparency, and **environmental sustainability** in their management. 6. Capitalize on the potential for environmental cooperation to contribute to peacebuilding: **Every state needs** to use and protect vital natural **resources** such as forests, water, fertile land, energy and biodiversity. **Environmental issues can thus serve as an effective** platform or **catalyst for** enhancing **dialogue,** building **confidence,** exploiting shared interests **and** broadening **cooperation** between divided groups, as well as between states.

### Scenario 1 is Growth

African civil wars kill growth and are worse than other wars. **Hoeffler 8** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

Taking the national level first, **one** clear **cost of civil war is** a **reduction in** economic **growth**. Using a panel data estimate, one year of conflict reduces a country’s growth rate by 2.2 percent. Since, on average, each civil conflict lasts for about seven years, **the economy will be 15 percent smaller** at the end of the war than if the war had not taken place. During the post-war recovery, even though the economy on average grows at an annual rate of more than 1 percent above the norm, **it will take** roughly **ten years to return to** its **pre-war growth rates** (that is, 17 years after the conflict started). **21 years after** the start of the original war**,** the **GDP has returned to the level it would have achieved if no war had occurred. The** total economic **cost**, expressed as a present value at the start of the war (using a 5 percent discount rate), **is 105 percent of** the **GDP** at that point. The welfare of a country’s population is further reduced because of increased military spending during and after the war. It is estimated that **military spending increases** by about 1.8 percent during the war, and only falls back by 0.5 percent once the conflict has ended. Assuming that this higher level of spending lasts for only ten years after the conflict, the **additional cost** (expressed again as present value when the conflict started) **is 18 percent of GDP**. In addition, conflict has a severe effect on human health. One way of summarising this effect is to express the cost in terms of Disability Affected Life Years (DALYs): a measure of the total number of people affected and the period for which their disability lasts. An average war causes an estimated 0.5 million DALYs each year. Assuming they decline smoothly to zero in the 21st year and discounting them at 5 percent as for the direct economic costs gives a figure of 5 million DALYs as the net present value of health costs when hostilities start. If each DALY is valued at $1,000 (roughly the per capita income in many at-risk countries), the economic cost of **harm to** human **health** in a typical war **is** around **$5 billion.** *Regional Costs* What are the effects at the regional level? Regression analysis suggests that the growth rate of neighbouring countries not directly involved in the conflict is reduced by 0.9 percent during the war. If they subsequently recover at the same rate as the conflict country, the additional cost (as a present value at the start of the conflict) is 43 percent of initial GDP. **On average, each country has 2**.7 **neighbours, so the direct effect of** a typical civil war on **neighbouring countries is 115 percent of** the **initial GDP of one country**: greater than the direct effect in the conflict country itself. There is also an effect on military spending in adjoining countries: a neighbourhood arms race often ensues. In the average case considered so far, a 1 percent rise in military expenditure in the country at war would increase the average spending of bordering countries by 0.23 percent. In a typical conflict, that means military spending will increase by 0.4 percent of GDP during the war, and by 0.3 percent during the post-conflict period: a total net present value of 4.3 percent of the country’s initial GDP. On average, there are 2.7 neighbouring countries; thus the total extra cost of the regional arms race is about 12 percent of one country’s GDP. Other costs which are too difficult to quantify are incurred both in the country at war and in the region as a whole, including forced migration and increased disease. With the proviso that the figures so far are therefore underestimated to some degree, the total benefit of averting a single “typical” civil war can be calculated. The various national and regional costs covered so far amount to 250 percent of initial GDP. The average GDP of conflict-affected low-income countries just prior to war is $19.7 billion. **Therefore, the cost of a single war is** around $49 billion. To this we must add $5 billion of health costs, giving a total cost of **$54 billion for a** single **low-income country**. *Legacy Effect* This is already a significant figure, but in addition there is the “conflict trap”: countries that have just experienced a civil war are more likely to have further conflict. Looking at the 21 countries in which wars started and ended in the period 1965-99, the risk of conflict over the five years before the war averaged 22.3 percent, but this rose to 38.6 percent post-war. Over the 15 year period needed for the risk to reach the pre-war level again, the additional discounted cost are estimated at $10.2 billion. Thus the total national and regional cost of a single war is more than $64 billion. **There are** additional, **global impacts of civil wars**, massive in scale but difficult to assign a cost to. For example three world scourges over the last 30 years have had civil conflicts as contributory factors**:** hard **drug production, AIDS and** international **terror**ism. Thus, since the global cost are not included in the $64 billion it should be treated as a conservative estimate. This cost calculation of about $64bn is based on global data. Is this estimate relevant for Africa? Africa’s economies are smaller and the average GDP figure is lower, hence the loss of GDP would be lower if only African countries were to be considered. On the other hand **African wars are longer and cause**d **more loss of life,** thus **increasing the cost** of war. **African countries also have** on average **more neighbours** and thus an Africa specific estimate of the regional effects of war would be higher.

Resource extraction doesn’t benefit developing economies.

**Singh and Bourgouin 13** write[[25]](#footnote-25)

Natural resource capital represents a particular type of capital. Most obviously, it is cyclically prone to windfall booms and busts. Historically, resource commodities have been subjected to external shocks and sharp flux in commodity prices, as was seen with the severe contraction of demands for certain minerals in the wakes of the two World Wars and the Great Depression (Bulmer, 1994). With global market integration, commodity prices have increasingly become susceptible to speculation in the international minerals markets, which adversely affect the production processes (Webb, 1999). From both an economic as well as a policy viewpoint, **extractive resources’** relative absence of value added together with their **price volatility** on world markets **make them an unreliable source of income** for national governments (Auty, 1993; Humphreys et al., 2007; Sachs & Warner, 1997, 2001). Moreover, booming **resource sectors** are believed to **draw capital** and labour away **from** a country’s **manufacturing and ag**ricultural sectors, thereby raising their production costs (Ross, 2001: 305) and leading to the appreciation of real exchange rates caused by the sharp rise in commodity exports, an observation referred to as the Dutch Disease . **Hence,** resource-led development is considered unlikely as **booms fail to bring investments into** the **more stable and dynamic sectors of the economy**, such as manufacturing, but instead, direct investment and factor inputs towards the resource sector. Similarly, the open access exploitation hypothesis suggests that not only does extraction under open access conditions generate few resource rents to be reinvested but it also leads to over-exploitation of natural capital in the long run, thus curbing the development potential of the resource sector. For others, **unfavourable environmental conditions may directly inhibit** the efficient generation of natural resource rents and **sustainable returns through** the **reinvestment** of rents **into** other **productive assets, as well as indirectly through** a **long-lasting influence on** patterns of **political and legal** institutional **development** (Auty, 2001, 1993; Barbier, 2005, 2003; Easterly & Levine, 2003). The observed inability of developing states to transform resource wealth into productive capital over past decades has become the central preoccupation of economists and political scientists alike, not to mention of scholars of development. The dominant view is that the revenues generated from natural capital are not comparable to income that can be reinvested as profits. Unlike in the productive sectors of the economy, **windfall profits from extraction do not multiply and as** the **resources** upon which they are based **are de facto depletable, extractive industries are unsustainable over the long run** (Humphreys et al., 2007; Karl, 2007 ). In this regard, the recent tendency of turning resource revenues into sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) that cannot be spent in the domestic economy has become the prescriptive response of the World Bank to reduce the deleterious effects of uncertainty in the resource sector.

### Scenario 2 is Terrorism

Oil is exacerbating South Sudan conflict now, risking civil war.

**Doki and Straziuso 13** write[[26]](#footnote-26)

**Armed rebels are said to be in control of some of South Sudan's oil fields**, raising questions of how long the country's oil will flow and whether Sudan could enter the conflict. President Salva Kiir implored his country to turn away from ethnic violence and met on Friday (local time) with foreign ministers from neighbouring states, including Kenya and Ethiopia, who flew into Juba, the capital, to help calm tensions after a week of **ethnic strife** that **is estimated to have killed hundreds**. Kiir did not speak publicly, but the government's Twitter feed attributed this quote to him: "Those who may want to take the law into their hands, the long arm of the government will get them." Fighting continued to spread on Friday in two states, Unity - an oil area - and Jonglei, as armed groups opposed to the nation's military emerged, said a South Sudan expert communicating with combatants and UN officials in strife-torn regions outside the capital. "**We've seen the conflict expand** quite **rapidly and** quite **dramatically in recent days**. We've seen the emergence of different armed groups under different commands, and we've seen the former vice president say he's not interested in talks that don't end in Salva Kiir stepping down," said Casie Copeland, South Sudan analyst for the International Crisis Group. She added that the arrival of regional foreign ministers in Juba "is genuinely a good thing." Armed opposition groups appeared to be in control of some oil fields in Unity state, she said. South Sudan's oil fields have historically been a target for rebel movements. **"The potential for oil wealth to exacerbate** the current **power struggle should not be underestimated," said** Emma **Vickers of Global Witness, a** London-based **group that investigates** and campaigns to prevent **natural resource** related **conflict**. "If rebel forces were to capture the oil fields, they could effectively hold the government to ransom." The United Nations said on Friday that 35,000 people continue to seek refuge at UN bases in three locations across the country, including 20,000 at two bases in the capital. The US Embassy had a fifth emergency evacuation flight on Friday to move Americans out of the country. British, German and Dutch planes were also scheduled to fly out. Hundreds of foreigners, including aid workers, have hurriedly left South Sudan this week at the urging of foreign embassies concerned about the possibility of out-of-control violence. Forty-five **US troops were dispatched** to Juba **earlier this week** to protect US citizens and property. A top UN official in the country, Toby Lanzer, said Friday that "difficulties" continued in Jonglei state, including the province capital, Bor, where a top military commander loyal to Machar defected from the army this week, taking his troops with him. South Sudan gets nearly 99 per cent of its government budget from oil revenues. The country reportedly earned US$1.3 billion in oil sales in just five months this year, Global Witness said. South Sudan, the world's newest country, peacefully broke away from Sudan in 2011 after decades of war and years of negotiations that former US President George W Bush invested heavily in. The south's oil flows north through Sudan's pipelines, and a rebel takeover of southern oil fields could invite Sudan into the conflict. . **Ethnic violence broke out** among South Sudan's presidential guard late on Sunday night, and fighting spread across the country over the next several days, **leading to fears of a civil war** between ethnic groups. Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, earlier this week said an attempted coup had triggered the violence, and the blame was placed on fired Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer. But officials have since said a fight between Dinka and Nuer members of the presidential guard triggered the violence. Machar's ouster from the country's No. 2 political position earlier this year had stoked ethnic tensions.

South Sudan civil war increases terrorism.

**All Africa 13** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

Washington, DC — The **expanding fighting in** the Republic of **South Sudan** has killed more than 500 people in recent days and injured four U.S. military personnel who were evacuating Americans and other foreigners from the country. The conflict endangers not only citizens of that country but **threatens** to negatively impact the country’s neighbors and **the international community**, said Congressman Chris Smith (N.J.-04), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. “Already more than 500 people are reported dead,” said Smith. “More could be killed or injured, and not only in South Sudan—**the conflict may spread, threatening people in neighboring countries**. The escalating **fighting** in South Sudan **could likely lead to more terrorist activities** in an already-volatile region. The Administration’s call for a Christmas season cease-fire must be augmented by intense diplomacy with both sides.” **South Sudan**, the world’s newest nation, **borders countries** already **troubled with terror**ist activity **by the** Lord’s Resistance Army (**LRA**) **and** various **Islamic radical** and other militia **groups** in the Central African Republic, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Analysts fear that **a South Sudan** distracted and **divided by civil war would provide** an **easier operating ground** for terrorist groups. The LRA terrorist group, notorious for kidnapping children and forcing them to serve as child soldiers, still operates in the region and poses a danger to the lives of civilians in all four countries. Meanwhile, Islamic radicals have infiltrated countries in the region, most notably Somalia, but also Ethiopia and even Uganda. An unstable South Sudan will only further empower them by providing the kind of chaos in which the radicals thrive. The entire Sahel region of north-central Africa has been targeted, with Mali having been torn apart by their violent activities and nations such as Niger, Chad and Central African Republic continuing to be adversely affected by their militant and terroristic actions.

Africa resource extraction independently fuels al Qaeda influence and Africa is key.

**Dehez 5** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

One of the reasons why Africa deserves international attention is actually the war on terror. **For international terror**ist networks **Africa** is a main target; it **serves as a safe haven and** provides an effective **financial basis** with its large networks of informal economies. Africa has furthermore slowly emerged as one of the key strategic fields of international resources. The oil in the Gulf of Guinea is of major interest to the United States and Europe alike. The U.S. currently imports some 16% of its total oil imports from the African continent, Nigeria being one of its five most important oil suppliers. During the next four or five years these figures will rise substantially to some 25%. Its not only oil that is driving the interests of nations and corporations, its also other raw materials like coltan for relatively new industrial products, like mobile phones. The **rising importance of African resources for the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe is** particularly **worrying as Africa had become** what some have called **the “underbelly for transnational terror**ism**”.**2 Largely unnoticed major parts of Africa have been the scene for Islamisation since the late 1970s. It is this mixture of strategic resources, Islamisation, and state weakness that makes Africa so an inviting target for terrorism and terrorist networks. Terrorism in Africa The fact that terrorism has emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the West was by no means a surprise. Back in 1995 the NATO Secretary General Willy Claes warned: The threat by fundamental Islam in Africa has to be taken seriously. “Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western Security.”3 In sub-Saharan Africa Islam has advanced significantly in the last couple of years. Some analysts fear that Niger may break up; into a Muslim dominated North and a Christian dominated South. Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal also have strong Muslim minorities.4 Some analysts go as far as claiming that there are already centres of Islam in Africa, considering the tropical zone along the Gulf of Guinea, the Sudanese Nile region and the East African coastal strip as such centres of Islam.5 There are strong Muslim minorities in Mocambique, Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, Burkina, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. In some other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Islam is already a majority religion: Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia.6**In Nigeria** for instance some **twelve provinces introduced** the **Shari’a** as basic law **and** Osama **bin Laden called it one of the countries he wanted to “liberate”. Somalia serves a safe haven for terror**ist **groups** like Al-Itihaad al-Islamyia, which is **linked to Al-Qaeda.** This particular terrorist cell is held responsible for the attacks on U.S. soldiers during the U.N. mission Restore Hope, which left 18 U.S. soldiers dead and about 75 wounded.8 Islam is one index of identity, alongside ethnicity and regional loyalties and so far African Islam has been relatively moderate. But as David McCormack recently pointed out, African Islam is slowly turning into Islamism in Africa.9 In West Africa one of the major reasons for the instability of the coastal strip and its countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia is the divison into a Christian dominated South and a Muslim dominated North. More aggressive interpretations of Islam are promoted by Saudi Arabia and Iran, through building of mosques, financial support for the hajj and the provision of education. The presence of the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youths in East Africa has had a radicalising influence on the local population.10 The threat by fundamentalist Islam in Africa has to be taken seriously. Three years before 9/11, Africa was targeted by Al-Qaeda. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi caused 224 casualties, including 12 Americans. Since 1996 the number of international terrorist incidents in Africa increased dramatically. While in 1996 eleven incidents had been reported, the number exploded to fifty-five incidents in 2000.11 Although Africa is comparatively less effected by international terrorism (although it experienced some of the bloodiest attacks)12 that does not indicate that it deserves less attention. Quite on the contrary, it should be one of the major focuses in the struggle against terrorism. The core problems the international community has to face on the African continent are: ungoverned parts of Africa, especially in failed states, which often serve as safe haven for terrorists and other states that serve as transit hubs to the Middle East, like Kenya, conditions of conflict that may lead to more alienation from traditional identities and thus providing breeding ground for more radical forms of Islam, that nearly 40% of Africa's total population are already Muslim, while a more fundamentalist version of Islam is promoted with financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Iran, that widespread guerilla warfare might turn into urban terrorism,13 that informal economic structures might serve as an ideal environment to money laundering,14 and finally that Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), donors, and other western institutions might provide an easy and inviting target for international terrorism.15 Given this background one might wonder, why Africa did not experience more terrorist attacks in the past.16 The main reason is that failing states provide a suitable environment for sub-national terrorism. But sub-national terrorism does not count as international terrorism, that has, per defintionem, to affect more than one country.17 While weak and failed states with their lack of territorial control make it easier for opposition movements or potential terrorist organisations to seize power. Groups that do not have the ability to control territory – as is the case in most countries in the Middle East – tend to terrorist strategies. But as long as these opposition groups maintain territorial areas of control they do not tend to terrorist attacks; they prefer what some analysts label guerilla warfare.18 Guerilla warfare is by no means less brutal than other forms of terrorism, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone proved that their guerilla warfare is indeed yet another form of terrorism. The African Union's regional instrument to counter terrorism is the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism established in 1999.19 It defines terrorism as a form of international crime: a result of the fact that Africa serves as a suitable and ideal environment to finance terror. **African states realised** back to **two years before 9/11 that terror**ism **exploits** the **differences in governance, porous borders, and illegal** and informal **trade** networks.20After the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1373.21 This resolution was binding and called for the suppression of the recruitment, financing and supply of terrorist networks (although many African governments committed themselves to the war on terror, they lack the means to effectively do so). In the same resolution the United Nations Security Council was aware that one of the major problems is the connection between terrorism and international organised crime. This especially concerned Africa, where drugs and arms trafficking and informal economic structures are prelevant.22 Strategic Resources and International Terrorism Africa with its huge networks of informal economy is furthermore a suitable environment for terrorist groups to finance themselvs. There are rumours that Al-Qaeda profited from the informal economic structures in Africa. Although there is not yet enough evidence, many analysts think its plausible that Al-Qaeda was involved in the diamonds trade in Sierra Leone and in gems trafficking in Tanzania, thus prolonging tensions and conflicts.23 Some observers even argue that Al-Qaeda owned up to nearly 15 vessels for any kind of transport, using Somalia as an operational basis. Additionally there are also reports that Al-Qaeda was involved in Gold smuggling from Pakistan to Sudan.24 **What makes Africa so** attractive and **vulnerable to terrorists** and international crime **is its resources**. Especially in West Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea are vast amounts of oil. Gold, iron ore, bauxite, diamonds, and uranium attract not only big western companies but also illegal and informal entrepreneurs. In Central Africa gold, iron, oil, diamonds do the same; coltan is also available, which is especially important for those industries producing mobile phones and other electronic equipment.25 As the United States want to increase the African part of their oil supplies, more attention will be drawn to Nigeria, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tomé e Principe.26 Some 25% of overall U.S. oil imports will come from Africa within the next four or five years.27 But the security sector in Africa is weak and on-shore as well as off-shore oil production is a very inviting target, especially in Nigeria. In the past mineral resources played a key role in financing civil war and different militias. Illegal diamond trade was a major source to finance the war between the Angolan government and the UNITA.28 The instability in the Democratic Reublic of Congo is largely due to the attractiveness of a vast amount of mineral resources in the region. Their illegal exploitation is a central way of financing for different milita groups in the whole country. One central precondition of illegal expoliatiation are porous borders. The smuggling of diamonds and other raw materials across the borders in central Africa is a key obstacle to freedom and peace in the region. As long as illegal trade is that simple providing stability in the region will be very difficult even for democratic states; and missions to provide stability in the region are designated to fail, as attacks on MONUC soldiers in the province of Ituri in early 2005 showed. It therefore must be of a key priority to Europeans and Americans alike to maintain more control over Africa's economy and to promote more border control by the African state authorities. A Change in Policies? After 9/11 the United States reviewed its foreign and development policy. One basic conclusion was that **despite** all international **aid** and financial injections **most** development **countries in Africa** simply **did not experience development**. The National Security Strategy set up in 2002 was the first attempt to counter that challenge. No development in development countries however did not suggest that development aid was futile, but rather that development aid had to be conducted in a different way. The new National Security Strategy marked the first time, when the United States began to take the threat of failed and weak states serious. The U.S. tried to tackle the issue and committed itself to more development aid but at the same time made it part of their National Security Agenda. **Development policy since has a goal: Improving security for the U**nited **S**tates **and their allies**. It was no longer a senseless expenditure to prove the selflessness of Western nations but was turned into an important mean of foreign and security affairs and thereby giving it a much higher priority in overall political affairs. However until now this change has only been rhetoric. State failure and state weakness in Africa is still a widespread problem. Somalia is an outstanding case in this regard. It experienced a military coup d’etat in the early postcolonial period, was an ally to both the Soviet Union and the United States, entered a bloody civil war, followed by international intervention and withdrawal and the secession of a major part of the country, of what is now called Somaliland. But renewed efforts by the African Union and the regional body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) go without significant support of the United States. State failure is an imminent threat in other African countries as well, as in Nigeria and Eritrea.29 There is a whole volatile region from Liberia to Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea where state failure is a common threat, thus preparing a potential breeding ground for terrorism in the medium future. But despite the rising significance of these regions for their natural resources initiatives to promote peace, stability and democracy have been limited. Although after 9/11 the United States released a new doctrine– the U.S. now considers Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia as key countries of their interest in Africa – in the very same doctrine the United States stated that no U.S. troops will be dispatched to the African continent in peacekeeping missions.30 The same goes for the G8 countries: Although they have recognised that “Sustained and better co-ordinated support for the African Peace and Security Architecture and for post-conflict is required”31, they have not yet allocated the necessary financial support nor have they increased their diplomatic activity.

Terrorism is the most likely existential threat. **Rhodes 9**[[29]](#footnote-29)

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005.

This group of **85 experts judged that** the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real and increasing over time**. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. **There was strong**, though not universal, **agreement that** a **nuclear attack is more likely** to be carried out **by a terrorist organization than by a government.** The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations will face an existential threat** from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike** on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely **initiat[ing]**e **a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

## Framework

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Second, my standard controls the link to any practical reason or contract frameworks because rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

Third, reductionism.

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[31]](#footnote-31)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[32]](#footnote-32)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Fourth, util is epistemologically necessary. Everyone values happiness whether they want to or not. Even people who claim they’re skeptics wouldn’t shoot themselves in the foot.

And fifth, act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 05** write[[33]](#footnote-33)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[34]](#footnote-34)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[35]](#footnote-35) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[36]](#footnote-36)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

## Even More Theory Preempts

1. Wiki solves predictability.

2. Err aff on theory. There was a 5% neg side bias at Strake Jesuit based on prelims and elims according to Joy of Tournaments. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

3. Case outweighs theory. Students’ analyzing environmental issues is critical for sustainable solutions. This must be coupled with policy advocacy to succeed.

**Cotgrave and Alkhaddar 06**[[37]](#footnote-37)

Environmental education Many writers have determined that **the main aim of environmental education is to change attitudes, that will in turn change behaviour**. As long ago as 1976, Ramsey and Rickson identified that it has long been known that the basis for many environmental problems is irresponsible behaviour. Without a doubt, one of the most important influences on behaviour is attitude, that in turn is influenced by education. Campbell Bradley et al. (1999) stress the need for trying to change young people’s environmental attitudes because young people ultimately will be affected by, and will need to provide, solutions to environmental problems arising from present day actions. **As future policymakers, the youth** of today **will be responsible for ‘fixing’ the environment** **and they will be the ones who must be persuaded to act now** in order to avoid paying a high price to repair damage to the environment in the future, if indeed it is repairable. Therefore it appears that effective environmental education, which changes the attitudes of young people, is crucial. The (then) Department for Education (DFE) report, commonly known as the ‘Toyne Report’ (DFE, 1993), concluded that **as education seeks to lead opinion, it will do so more effectively if it keeps in mind the** distinctive nature of **its mission,** which is first and foremost **to improve** its **students’ understanding**. Their concern may well be awakened as a result; but it must be a properly informed concern. This does not necessarily mean treating the environment as a purely scientific issue, but does mean that the respective roles of science and ethics need to be distinguished, and the complexities of each need to be acknowledged. Failure to do this may lead all too readily to an ‘environmentalism’ which, by depicting possibilities as certainties, can only discredit itself in the long run and feed the complacency which it seeks to dispel. McKeown-Ice and Dendinger (2000) have identified the fact that scientific knowledge and political intervention will not solve the environmental problem on their own, thus implying that something additional is required to change behaviour. As has already been discussed, behaviour changes can only occur if attitudes change and this can be achieved through education. As Fien (1997) identifies, environmental education can play a key role by creating awareness, and changing people’s values, skills and behaviour. Introducing environmental elements into the curriculum can therefore be seen as a potentially effective way of transferring knowledge. This should in turn improve attitudes that will lead to improvements in environmental behaviour. Graham (2000) believes that it is crucial that building professionals not only participate in the creation of projects that have low environmental impact, but equally it is important that they learn to conceive, nurture, promote and facilitate the kind of paradigm changes seen as necessary to create a sustainable society. **There are** however **limitations as to what education can achieve on its own**, for as Jucker (2002) believes, **if we do not** do everything we can to **transform our political**, economic and social **systems** into more sustainable structures, **we might as well forget the educational part.**

4. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory, killing substantive education. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

5. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[38]](#footnote-38)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

# Systemic Impacts AC

## Advocacy

**Plan**: Developing countries in Africa should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in cross-ex. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism.

**Nelson 8** writes[[39]](#footnote-39)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

**Contention 1** is African Wars

Prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction is key to solving African wars.

**UNEP 9** writes[[40]](#footnote-40)

Since 1990 at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources. In fact, recent research suggests that over the last sixty years at least **forty percent of** all **intrastate conflicts have a link to natural resources. Civil wars** such as those **in Liberia, Angola and the** Democratic Republic of **Congo have centred on** “high-value” **resources like** timber, diamonds, gold, **minerals and oil**. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water. As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, **there is significant potential for conflicts over** natural **resources to intensify in the coming decades.** In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution may aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts. Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict. Ethnicity, adverse economic conditions, low levels of international trade and conflict in neighbouring countries are all significant drivers of violence. However, the **exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of** the **conflict** cycle**, from** contributing to the **outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace.** In addition, the environment can itself fall victim to conflict, as direct and indirect environmental damage, coupled with the collapse of institutions, can lead to environmental risks that threaten people’s health, livelihoods and security. Because the way that natural resources and the environment are governed has a determining influence on peace and security, these issues can also contribute to a relapse into conflict if they are not properly managed in post-conflict situations. Indeed, preliminary findings from a retrospective analysis of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicate that **conflicts associated with** natural **resources are twice as likely to relapse** into conflict in the first five years. Nevertheless, **fewer than a quarter of peace negotiations** aiming to resolve conflicts linked to natural resources **have addressed resource management** mechanisms. The recognition that environmental issues can contribute to violent conflict underscores their potential significance as pathways for cooperation, transformation and the consolidation of peace in war-torn societies. Natural resources and the environment can contribute to peacebuilding through economic development and the generation of employment, while cooperation over the management of shared natural resources provides new opportunities for peacebuilding. These factors, however, must be taken into consideration from the outset. Indeed, deferred action or poor choices made early on are easily “locked in,” establishing unsustainable trajectories of recovery that can undermine the fragile foundations of peace. **Integrating environment** and natural resources **into peacebuilding** is no longer an option – it **is a security imperative.** The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission provides an important chance to address environmental risks and capitalize on potential opportunities in a more consistent and coherent way. In this context, UNEP recommends that the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the wider international community consider the following key recommendations for integrating environment and natural resource issues into peacebuilding interventions and conflict prevention: 1. Further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action: The UN system needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and environmental issues. At the same time, the effective governance of natural resources and the environment should be viewed as an investment in conflict prevention. 2. Improve oversight and protection of natural resources during conflicts: The international community needs to increase oversight of “high-value” resources in international trade in order to minimize the potential for these resources to finance conflict. International sanctions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources and the UN should require Member States to act against sanctions violators. At the same time, new legal instruments are required to protect natural resources and environmental services during violent conflict. 3. Address natural resources and the environment as part of the peacemaking and peacekeeping process: During peace mediation processes, wealth-sharing is one of the fundamental issues that can “make or break” a peace agreement. In most cases, this includes the sharing of natural resources, including minerals, timber, land and water. It is therefore critical that parties to a peace mediation process are given sufficient technical information and training to make informed decisions on the sustainable use of natural resources. Subsequent peacekeeping operations need to be aligned with national efforts to improve natural resource and environmental governance. 4. Include natural resources and environmental issues into integrated peacebuilding strategies: The UN often undertakes post-conflict operations with little or no prior knowledge of what natural resources exist in the affected country, or of what role they may have played in fuelling conflict. In many cases it is years into an intervention before the management of natural resources receives sufficient attention. A failure to respond to the environmental and natural resource needs of the population can complicate the task of fostering peace and even contribute to conflict relapse. 5. Carefully harness natural resources for economic recovery: **Natural resources can only** help strengthen the post-war economy and **contribute to economic recovery if** they are **managed well**. The international community should be prepared to help national authorities manage the extraction process and revenues in ways that do not increase risk of further conflict, or are unsustainable in the longer term. **This must go hand in hand with** ensuring accountability, transparency, and **environmental sustainability** in their management. 6. Capitalize on the potential for environmental cooperation to contribute to peacebuilding: **Every state needs** to use and protect vital natural **resources** such as forests, water, fertile land, energy and biodiversity. **Environmental issues can thus serve as an effective** platform or **catalyst for** enhancing **dialogue,** building **confidence,** exploiting shared interests **and** broadening **cooperation** between divided groups, as well as between states.

Africa wars last longer and are deadlier than other wars.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[41]](#footnote-41)

This section provided an overview of the public health burden of war in Africa. **Africa’s wars last longer and are deadlier** than in other regions. **Recent surveys suggest that the war in the DRC has claimed** a total of **3.9 million lives, making it the world’s deadliest war since World War II.** While young men make up the highest share of fatalities in combat, the increased disease burden disproportionately affects women and children. **Wars continue to kill long after the fighting stops.** Health sectors in post-conflict economies are devastated and unable to meet the huge demand for health services. **Typically there are no resources to deal with the trauma of war. Civil wars also have health consequences for** the **neighbouring countries.** Regional disease control programmes are interrupted and preventable communicable diseases continue to kill in Africa. Temporary cease fires for vaccinations and other disease control measures have been successful to lessen the regional consequences of war. **Wars also cause displacement on a massive scale.** In 2006 about 31 percent of refugees worldwide originated from African countries and 42 percent of all IDPs were displaced in African countries.

Civil wars kill disability-adjusted life years.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[42]](#footnote-42)

**Wars affect peoples’** lives long after the fighting has stopped. Wars do not only kill but they also cause disability due to injury or increased disease burden. One way to measure the effects is to calculate disability adjusted life expectancy or **disability adjusted life years** (DALYs). These **data** are **compiled by the** World Health Organisation (**WHO**). These measures **take into account** both years of life lost because of **disease and injury and years of healthy life lost to long term disability. Ghoborah, Huth and Russett** (2003) **use these measures to estimate the cost of civil war and find that in** 19**99** about **8**.4 **million DALYs were lost as a direct effect** of all wars that were ongoing. In addition, a further 8 million DALYs were lost as a result of civil wars that had ended during 1991-97. Thus, the legacy effect of civil wars ending during the 1990s on DALYs was approximately as large as the effect of ongoing conflict at the end of the decade. **This legacy impact works its way through specific diseases** and conditions**, and disproportionately affects women and children.**

African wars cause PTSD and undermine treatment

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[43]](#footnote-43)

In addition to physical diseases **war leaves people traumatised. Most** of the **victims** of civil war **are civilians and they are** **subjected to or witness** war-related traumatic events such as **shootings,** killings, **rape, torture and loss of family** members. **A** random household **survey** of residents and internally displaced persons **in Freetown** in 1999 **showed** that almost every respondent was exposed to conflict. **Fifty percent of the respondents lost someone to whom they were** very **close, 41 percent** actually **witnessed their death. Torture was witnessed by 54 percent**, executions by 41 percent, amputations by 32 percent and public rape by 14 percent. The witnessing of such events can lead to serious psychological stress. The **health services in post-conflict countries are poorly functioning. Medical staff** are facing huge problems of physical diseases they **have** no or very **little resources to address p**ost**-t**raumatic **s**tress **d**isorder**.**

Prefer empirical studies that evaluate systemic impacts.

Expert predictions alone should carry zero epistemological weight. **Menand 5**[[44]](#footnote-44)

Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The **respondents were asked to rate the probability of** three alternative **outcomes**: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an *x* per cent chance of happening happen *x* per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the **experts performed worse than** they would have **if they had** simply **assigned** an **equal probability to all** three **outcomes**—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. **Human** being**s who spend their lives studying** the state of **the world**, in other words, **are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys**, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York *Times* in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” **And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts.** “**Experts in demand**,” Tetlock says, “**were more overconfident than their colleagues** who eked out existences far from the limelight.”

Reject specific disad link chains. Linear scenario planning is more likely to cause extinction than solve it. **Skyttner 5** writes[[45]](#footnote-45)

Today the socio-technical **systems** of the modern society **are** increasingly all embracing and tighter **integrated**. System-relations **more and more** stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and **unmanageable.** Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that **circumstantial planning** often **is a thing of the past.** The **uncertainties** regarding the nature of future combat therefore **bring** about great **demands of flexibility** and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena. As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education. Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. **Russia still has attacking capability** via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West. Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards an ever increasing extent of **terrorist groups** with better and better armaments. No doubt, some of these groups **have NBC-weapons**. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time. A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information technology related. **States** as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today **use IT**-related systems as **weapons** apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society. It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from economical warfare. Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries. Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the old and exact security-policy classification into “war” and “peace” hardly is relevant today. **A war**-like terror action with disastrous consequence **can happen without early warning** in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values – not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be the following: territorial integrity in the livingspace; political sovereignty and democracy; freedom of thought, religion and speech; a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights; free market economy; and the free university. In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation. All this taken together is the reason why **big-scale problem solving seldom work as before.** The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The **lack of success** for traditional methods **is visible** also **on** civil frontiers like the war against **poverty**, the war against drugs, **and** the attempts to extinct **AIDS.** The new, multinational and **complex** threatening **pictures** which have replaced the old ones, **can only be met with** a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent a more **flexible** way of **handling** a new situation – to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions. Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat. The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (“Battlefield Computer Games”), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews. Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below: Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter. Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it. Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat. Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield. Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics. New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage. A science of command and control Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short. A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists. With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of “The Art of War” may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive. A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control. In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity. In reality, the described control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. “**Everything is connected to everything else**”. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label “A science of command and control” should be irrelevant. To synthesize a **new** subject field like **command and control will imply** the finding and **understanding** of the **joint factors** existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as **a starting point for problem-solving** and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented. The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality. The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat). A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control. This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal. The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible? Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved. The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be transferred to other instances. Today a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts. Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call? Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons. The need for a comprehensive theory For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a meta-theory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal. A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely: what theories represent the core of the field? which methods are used? which sources are used? and to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable? Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General **Systems Theory** (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It **examines generalizations**, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline **it can transfer** its **knowledge**-structure **to other areas** without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits. A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that **its main task is to** help scientists to **elucidate** the **complexity** of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

## Framework

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[46]](#footnote-46)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Second, my standard controls the link to any practical reason or contract frameworks because rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

Third, reductionism.

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[47]](#footnote-47)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[48]](#footnote-48)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Fourth, util is epistemologically necessary. Everyone values happiness whether they want to or not. Even people who claim they’re skeptics wouldn’t shoot themselves in the foot.

And fifth, act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 05** write[[49]](#footnote-49)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[50]](#footnote-50)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[51]](#footnote-51) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked. Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[52]](#footnote-52)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

## Theory Preempts

1. Err aff on theory because of a 5% neg bias at Strake Jesuit and 4% neg bias at Sunvite according to Joy of Tournaments. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

2. Case outweighs theory. Students’ analyzing environmental issues is critical for sustainable solutions. This must be coupled with policy advocacy to succeed.

**Cotgrave and Alkhaddar 06**[[53]](#footnote-53)

Environmental education Many writers have determined that **the main aim of environmental education is to change attitudes, that will in turn change behaviour**. As long ago as 1976, Ramsey and Rickson identified that it has long been known that the basis for many environmental problems is irresponsible behaviour. Without a doubt, one of the most important influences on behaviour is attitude, that in turn is influenced by education. Campbell Bradley et al. (1999) stress the need for trying to change young people’s environmental attitudes because young people ultimately will be affected by, and will need to provide, solutions to environmental problems arising from present day actions. **As future policymakers, the youth** of today **will be responsible for ‘fixing’ the environment** **and they will be the ones who must be persuaded to act now** in order to avoid paying a high price to repair damage to the environment in the future, if indeed it is repairable. Therefore it appears that effective environmental education, which changes the attitudes of young people, is crucial. The (then) Department for Education (DFE) report, commonly known as the ‘Toyne Report’ (DFE, 1993), concluded that **as education seeks to lead opinion, it will do so more effectively if it keeps in mind the** distinctive nature of **its mission,** which is first and foremost **to improve** its **students’ understanding**. Their concern may well be awakened as a result; but it must be a properly informed concern. This does not necessarily mean treating the environment as a purely scientific issue, but does mean that the respective roles of science and ethics need to be distinguished, and the complexities of each need to be acknowledged. Failure to do this may lead all too readily to an ‘environmentalism’ which, by depicting possibilities as certainties, can only discredit itself in the long run and feed the complacency which it seeks to dispel. McKeown-Ice and Dendinger (2000) have identified the fact that scientific knowledge and political intervention will not solve the environmental problem on their own, thus implying that something additional is required to change behaviour. As has already been discussed, behaviour changes can only occur if attitudes change and this can be achieved through education. As Fien (1997) identifies, environmental education can play a key role by creating awareness, and changing people’s values, skills and behaviour. Introducing environmental elements into the curriculum can therefore be seen as a potentially effective way of transferring knowledge. This should in turn improve attitudes that will lead to improvements in environmental behaviour. Graham (2000) believes that it is crucial that building professionals not only participate in the creation of projects that have low environmental impact, but equally it is important that they learn to conceive, nurture, promote and facilitate the kind of paradigm changes seen as necessary to create a sustainable society. **There are** however **limitations as to what education can achieve on its own**, for as Jucker (2002) believes, **if we do not** do everything we can to **transform our political**, economic and social **systems** into more sustainable structures, **we might as well forget the educational part.**

3. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[54]](#footnote-54)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

4. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

5. Err against debaters who don’t disclose. It gives me an infinite research burden which kills fairness and pre-round topic education.

6. Err towards small schools on theory to account for resource disparity that makes it harder for me to win.

# Other Cards

## Impact Extensions

### War Extensions

Best studies go aff. Resource extraction increases the risk of African war, causing poverty, civilian death, disease, crime, mass migration, and kills democracy.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[55]](#footnote-55)

Within Figure 1 the number of wars in Africa is highlighted. The trend of rising prevalence throughout the Cold War and a decrease thereafter is similar for African countries. There are two peaks in the African series, 1991/1992 with eight and 1989 with nine wars. Since then the number of wars has fallen to two in 2006. If one takes into consideration that only about 12 percent of the global population live in Africa1 , it seems that **Africa has experienced more violent conflict than other continents. African wars have also lasted longer**, on average they lasted about eight years while the global average is about six and a half years.2 The question why Africa has seen more wars has been examined by a number of scholars. Colonial history and proxy wars throughout the Cold War are often at the core of the argument. Most of this amounts to an African ‘exceptionalism’, in other words Africa’s troubled past is Africa specific and cannot be analysed in the same way as wars in other parts 1 Based on population data for 2000, data source: WDI 2007, author’s calculation. 2 Data source: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data Set, author’s calculation. of the world. However, a **global statistical analysis** of the onset of civil wars **suggests that Africa has experienced more civil wars mainly because** the economic circumstances, **low income, low growth and high dependence on natural resources**, have **made war feasible** (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Taking these factors into consideration Africa has not experienced more wars than the continent’s characteristics would predict. In addition the **wars in Africa have** also **resulted in** making the continent poorer and **preventing development** in many countries. **This cycle of poverty and war has been described** as **a ‘conflict trap’** (see for example Collier, 2007). If colonial and Cold War history are the main causes of this trap there is not much hope for the future since we cannot change history. **If** on the other hand **economic factors are important determinants of conflict risk** (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004a, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2007) **there is hope that the future will not look like the past**. Since the 1990s Africa has seen a reduction in the prevalence of civil war and countries with long and devastating civil wars are now at peace. Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda are such examples. Countries suffer from many different consequences of civil war. Wars kill people in many different ways: **civilians and soldiers are killed in combat, people die because there is a higher prevalence of preventable** communicable **diseases and** during wars people are killed due to **increased violent crime. Wars force mass migration. Post-war economies are** in a **worse** shape than before the war **and** far from bringing an improvement to the political system, in general **post-war societies are less democratic** (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007a). **Countries with a violent past** also **face** a **high risk of renewed conflict, about 40 percent of countries experience a new civil war within a decade** (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). Dealing with the consequences of war is not only a humanitarian imperative but dealing with the economic and political consequences is also important because it decreases the risk of the civil war breaking out again. Dealing with the consequences of civil wars is our chance of ‘breaking the conflict trap’.

Resource extraction fuels African wars.

**OSAA 6** writes[[56]](#footnote-56)

**Natural resources** have been shown to **play a key role in** the **conflicts that have plagued** a number of **African countries** over the last decade, both motivating and fuelling armed conflicts. **Revenues** from the exploitation of natural resources are not only used for **sustain**ing armies but also for personal enrichment **and build**ing **political support.** As a result, they can become obstacles to peace as leaders of armed groups involved in exploitation are unwilling to give up control over these resources. Even when conflict gives way to a fragile peace, **control over natural resources** and their revenues **often stays in the hands of a small elite and is not used for broader development** of the country. **In the U**nited **N**ations Secretary General**’s** seminal **report** to the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1998 **on** the **causes of conflict and** the **promotion of** durable peace and **sustainable development in Africa, among the key economic factors identified as fuelling conflict was** the **illegal exploitation of natural resources.** Seven years later, in 2005, in the Secretary-General’s progress report to the 60th session of the General Assembly on the “Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”2 , **the Secretary-General** reiterated that illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict-prone and conflict-ridden countries continued to be one of the contributory causes of conflict and of its recurrence and **cited** the example of **Angola,** the Democratic Republic of **the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, where** natural **resources had provided major funding for** the perpetuation of **wars.** The report emphasized the need to address this issue, utilizing a range of instruments to limit the trade in conflict resources, including targeted sanctions against persons, products or regimes, certification schemes and the creation of expert panels to investigate illicit commercial activities in conflict zones as has been done in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The resolution on the causes of conflict3 underscored the need to address the negative implications of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in all its aspects on peace, security and development in Africa. Moreover, **the Security Council**, in a resolution4 adopted in 2005, **recognized the link between** the **illegal exploitation of** natural **resources,** the **illicit trade** in such resources **and** the **prolif**eration and trafficking **of arms as** one of the factors fuelling and **exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa**, and in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Natural resource dependence exacerbates Africa war which causes arms prolif and terror. Multiple warrants.

**OSAA 6** writes[[57]](#footnote-57)

The presenter, **Dr.** Abiodun **Alao**, **noted that** in the last decade, **perhaps no issue has engaged attention about Africa as much as** the numerous **conflicts involving** the ownership, management and control of natural **resources. Among the issues that have emerged are** violent ethno-nationalism, acrimonious inter-group relations, youth revolts, small **arms** and light weapons **prolif**eration, corruption, money laundering, cross-border looting **and alleged links with global terror**ism**.** Moreover, the conflicts have also introduced a diverse array of actors: sometimes working together; most times working at cross-purposes; but all the time working to advance narrow aspirations over and above wider public interests. While conflicts involving natural resources have increased and their devastating consequences have widened, interests have also expanded on how to ensure that natural resource endowments cease from causing tragedy and become instruments of peace, stability and post-conflict peace-building, especially in countries coming out of the throes of war. This is evidenced by the catalogue of national and international initiatives designed to stem illegal exploitation and sale of natural resources. Dr. Alao also pointed out that for African countries as well as international organizations with commitments towards the continent, the major challenges have been how to ensure that natural resources are used to promote responsible, just and economically productive purposes in post-conflict societies, and to develop mechanisms for ensuring equitable distribution of wealth to all stakeholders. Key discussion points In discussing the conditions that often give rise to conflicts over natural resources, it is necessary to point out that many of the issues are interwoven. While in some cases the issues have been distinctly identified as independent causes of conflict, others only become key indices in conflict when they align with others. **Evidence across the continent has shown that countries** that are **solely dependent on particular natural resources are more prone to conflict.** Of critical importance is the weakness of key state structures in most African states. The first is the weakness of political and corporate governance. The neopatrimonial nature of most rentier states readily lends itself to weak or poor corporate governance practices in relation to the regulation of the natural resource sector. Also relevant is the weakness of institutional and technical capacity. The major theatres of conflict coincidentally are countries that have poor administrative capacity to regulate the natural resource sector. 13 Closely related to the above is the nature of ownership rights in the continent. **Owing to** the **dysfunctional** nature of **political systems** in many African countries, many **private actors**, including the private citizenry and ethnic groups who inhabit regions with natural resource deposits, **often engage in conflict on the strength of** their **perceived ownership of** such **resources.** This brings to light the centrality of property right s issues in natural resource politics. The issue of unresolved ownership is also linked to illegal exploitation of natural resources, as evidenced by the huge black-marketing of stolen crude **in Nigeria**’s oil- rich Delta region, where **citizens** and ethnic minorities **do not feel constrained in tapping resources** found **on their land**, and which by implication belong to them as opposed to the Nigerian state. The peculiarities of certain natural resources can also predispose them to conflict, linked to easy accessibility by non-state actors. These attributes include ease of discovery and extraction process, ease of transportation and less-technical ways of conversion (processing) into use. **Land is** undoubtedly **the most important** natural **resource in Africa.** Every society in the continent sees land as a natural resource that is held in trust for future generations. Land is also the “abode” of most other natural resources. Most of the **conflicts over land can be linked to** the **inability of African countries to evolve a land tenure system** that is **acceptable to the population.** The difficulties of harmonizing land tenure systems that are incompatible and for which the population have varying degrees of recognition and respect, remains a major challenge of many African countries. Increasingly, **ag**ricultural **resources** are becoming linked to conflicts as they **have been used to finance civil wars.** Solid minerals have also been at the centre of controversies and conflicts in Africa. **Next** to solid minerals **is oil, whose linkage with conflict has generated** much interest and **attention in Africa because of** its high degree of profitability, the **environmental consequences of its exploitation**, the international nature of its politics and its role in the ethno-political and socioeconomic affairs of the endowed countries. A close look at conflicts over natural resources in Africa will show a somewhat peculiar regional flavour, both in the nature of the ir manifestations and the politics of their resolution. Of critical importance here is the Mano River Union, the Great Lakes region and the Gulf of Guinea, with particular emphasis on Nigeria’s Niger Delta.

Outweighs on magnitude. Africa wars are the worst.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[58]](#footnote-58)

This section provided an overview of the public health burden of war in Africa. **Africa’s wars last longer and are deadlier** than in other regions. **Recent surveys suggest that the war in the DRC has claimed** a total of **3.9 million lives, making it the world’s deadliest war since World War II.** While young men make up the highest share of fatalities in combat, the increased disease burden disproportionately affects women and children. **Wars continue to kill long after the fighting stops.** Health sectors in post-conflict economies are devastated and unable to meet the huge demand for health services. **Typically there are no resources to deal with the trauma of war. Civil wars also have health consequences for** the **neighbouring countries.** Regional disease control programmes are interrupted and preventable communicable diseases continue to kill in Africa. Temporary cease fires for vaccinations and other disease control measures have been successful to lessen the regional consequences of war. **Wars also cause displacement on a massive scale.** In 2006 about 31 percent of refugees worldwide originated from African countries and 42 percent of all IDPs were displaced in African countries.

### Africa War = Extinction

Africa war causes extinction. **Duetsch 02** writes[[59]](#footnote-59)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that **a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars** in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and **domestic instability** in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire **and other wars** (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) **turn into a really nasty stew**. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, **an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly**. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an **African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration**, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

Africa war goes global. **Glick 7** writes[[60]](#footnote-60)

**The Horn of Africa is** a **dangerous and strategically** **vital** place. **Small wars**, which rage continuously, can easily **escalate into big wars.** Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the **conflicts in this tinderbox,** which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, **can** potentially **give rise to** regional, and indeed global **conflagrations between** competing regional actors and **global powers.**

### Terror Impact Ext

Terrorism causes extinction. **Barrett et al. 13** writes[[61]](#footnote-61)

**War involving** significant fractions of the **U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals**, which are by far the largest of any nations, **could have** globally **catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production** for years,1 **potentially leading to** collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the **extinction** of humanity.2 **Nuclear war** between the United States and Russia **could occur by** various routes, including **accidental** or unauthorized **launch**; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that **inadvertent nuclear war between the U**nited **S**tates **and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk.**7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, **they have remained ready to launch** nuclear **missiles in response to indications of attack**.8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, **terror**ist **groups** or other actors **might cause attacks on either the U**nited **S**tates **or Russia that resemble some** kind of **nuclear attack** by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 **especially** if such an event occurs **during a crisis between the U**nited **S**tates **and Russia**.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible.12 **Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons** and to use them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. **There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions** between the United States and Russia**, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks.**

### AIDS Spillover

AIDS spread from war spills over across Africa, even in peaceful countries.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[62]](#footnote-62)

In contrast to the discussion on the health burden of civil war **HIV** prevalence **rates are actually higher in peaceful countries.** They have an average prevalence rate of almost 7.5 percent in the population aged 15 to 49 in comparison to about 4 percent in war countries. **This** high average prevalence rate **is driven by** the extremely high prevalence rates of almost 20 percent or more in a number of **southern Africa**n countries**: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.** Interestingly, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating does not statistically differ significantly between peace and war countries in Africa. **This rating** is a composite measure and **takes values from 1(poor) to 6 (excellent).** The average value for non-African countries is 3.5 and differs statistically significantly from the African average. **This may indicate that** institutional reform is still slow in Africa and/or **war countries generate** a lot of **negative spillover effects which decrease the rating of their peaceful neighbours.**

### Disease Outweighs

Disease causes most deaths in Africa, and African wars prevent disease from being solved.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[63]](#footnote-63)

One obvious recommendation is that we require more and higher quality data than currently available. Civil wars kill and maim but currently we do not know how many people die as a consequence of war. Although **one obvious consequence of civil war is a health burden** to affected countries it receives relatively little attention in the public health debate. This may be because only 0.3 percent of all global deaths are due to direct violence in conflict and we do not currently know by how much mortality is raised due to increased prevalence of communicable diseases in the long term. However, preventable communicable diseases are not the main cause of death worldwide. As Figure 5 shows, only one third of all global deaths are due to communicable diseases. This is different **for Africa, the overwhelming cause of death is** due to **communicable diseases, about 72 percent of deaths** are caused by communicable diseases. Wars also kill proportionally more people, 0.8 percent are killed by violence during wars. These figures may explain why war has received relatively little attention by public health experts. It kills relatively few people and the indirect effects of war on communicable diseases, the main killer in Africa, is hard to estimate. We do, however, know that the **eradication of communicable diseases** such as polio and dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease) **is impossible as long as wars prevent access to regions in which** these **diseases are still prevalent.**

### Child Warrior Impact

African wars involve child soldiers. **Hoeffler 8** writes[[64]](#footnote-64)

**An in depth study of the impact of** the **civil wars in Angola and Mozambique** on children by Homvana (2006) **shows that** the **use of child soldiers was part of** the **war**fare strategy. **Children were either recruited by force or** they joined because they **sought protection or revenge**. In **Mozambique** the **rebel forces**, RENAMO, **used a minimum of 10,000 child soldiers, some as young as six or seven** years of age. In 1994, 27 percent of the soldiers presenting themselves for demobilisation were under the age of 18 (Homvana, 2006: 139). **In Angola a considerable proportion of the country’s children took part in combat**, about seven percent of all Angolan children had fired at someone (Homvana, 2006:29). Children were thus victims and perpetrators of violence. With respect of reintegration of child soldiers Homvana describes how local cultural beliefs and practices are being used. Traditional healers, chiefs and the family often take part in cleansing rituals to heal returning child soldiers. These rituals are designed to help the child to heal and reintegrate as well as encourage reconciliation within the community. This communal approach contrasts with Western psychotherapy which places the emphasis on the individual. Boys and girls do face different problems of reintegration. Due to sexual violence or exchange of intercourse for protection girls often have babies of their own. This makes it more difficult for girls to catch up on education and job training. There is also a high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases which require treatment. Furthermore, due to their wartime sexual experiences, girls are often regarded as ‘second hand’ and thus vulnerable to further abuse since it is more difficult for them to find husbands and have an ordinary family life. Rather than advocating special programmes, Homvana suggests to place the reintegration of child soldiers in wider programmes of social development and poverty eradication.

## A2 Responses

### AT DDR

DDR doesn’t solve re-integration of ex-combatants. **Hoeffler 8** writes[[65]](#footnote-65)

[disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration programs]

A survey based **evaluation of** the **DDR** programme **in Sierra Leone** by Humphrey and Weinstein (2007) **suggests that** participation in **such programmes may not be critical for reintegration. The authors find no ev**idence **that ex-combatants find reintegration** into peaceful society **easier** if they take part **in a DDR programme**. The biggest obstacle to reintegration is whether individuals have in the past participated in abusive military factions. This survey of over 1,000 ex-combatants carried out in 2003 did not suggest that women and youths faced bigger challenges with respect to reintegration.

### AT Democracy

Democracy doesn’t solve.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[66]](#footnote-66)

**Does democracy stabilize peace?** Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) examine whether elections reduce the risk of recurrent conflict. **Elections** seem to **reduce the risk in the year of the election, but increases it in the year following the** election. Presumably, **in the election year antagonists divert** their **efforts** from violence **to political contest, where**as **once the election is concluded the losers have a stronger incentive to return to violence.** The overall effect of elections on the duration of peace is insignificant. Therefore, post-conflict elections should be promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the post-conflict peace.

### AT CPs

Legal regulations like sanctions don’t solve. **OSAA 6** writes[[67]](#footnote-67)

The **increased awareness of the impact of** national **resource exploitation in** weak and **wartorn countries has prompted** a variety of **policy responses ranging from** UN sanctions, to commodity control regimes, to efforts to improve both corporate conduct and host country governance. Initiatives aimed at improving the conduct of extractive companies in weak and war-torn settings fall along the spectrum from hard regulation, such as UN **sanctions** and legal prosecution **to** soft regulation, such as **voluntary codes** of responsible corporate conduct for extractive companies operating in fragile settings. Although **voluntary codes** and other forms of industry self-regulation **suffer from self-selection and weak enforcement**, they have provided important guidance and even a niche for progressive companies seeking to improve business practice in challenging operating environments. While **mandatory** or **legal regulation** is essential to the creation of a level playing field for conflict sensitive business and for addressing the most egregious conduct, it **cannot remedy** the many **conflict-promoting yet still legal activities.**

### AT PMC DA

Resource extraction in Africa fuels conflict by private mercenaries. **OSAA 6** writes[[68]](#footnote-68)

The presenter, Ms. Karen Ballentine, pointed out that **in Africa, as in other parts of the developing world,** the **exploitation of** natural **resources has** long **been associated with** underdevelopment and **violent conflict**, first under colonialism and more recently **under** the impact of **global** economic liberal**isation**. Over the last decade, the **privatization of the** global **market** place **has been accompanied by** a parallel, and not unrelated, **privatization of** the forces of **war. Armed conflicts have become** increasingly **self-financing, as rebel groups,** criminal networks, **mercenaries and predatory elites have** increasingly **relied on natural resource revenues** and more accessible global markets **to fund military activity.** Moreover, extractive companies, particularly large multi-national enterprises are a key, often indispensable, source of capital and technological investment for African countries. Although investors typically prefer stable and predictable environments, **extractive companies go wherever lucrative resources are** to be **found. Increasingly these resources are found** in fragile and **war-torn parts of Africa.** She noted that while most companies, unlike mercenaries and criminal profiteers, do not deliberately seek to profit from violence, **very often** their **investments and operations in weakly governed and unstable settings contribute to insecurity.** However law abiding they may seek to be, extractive companies often find themselves in situations where local rule of law is weak or absent, host government regulatory institutions broken, and economic activity beyond the reach of current international and trans-national frameworks. She observed that in the absence of supplementary regulation, **otherwise routine extractive activities can fuel conflict dynamics**, often in ways that are legally problematic.

## Other

### Africa Spec Good

Ci: Aff may specify Africa.

1. The Africa aff is the best middle ground of predictability and ground. VBT proves.

**Kuang and Tartakovsky 14** write[[69]](#footnote-69)

[RK] The biggest objection against plans, as is on most topics, is that they are difficult to predict and prepare answers to. **This topic is** especially bad in this regard, since it does not specify an actor and deals with a **very broad** subject area- most sources agree that there are over a hundred developing countries, home to multiple different resource extraction industries that can be changed with an almost infinite number of policy proposals. This objection might seem silly to policy debaters, who are used to a huge number of affs on every topic; in fact, in policy, whole-res affirmatives are something of a joke. However, policy resolutions are usually worded to narrow down the range of possible affirmatives to a far smaller subset than this resolution does. They typically specify an actor (the United States Federal Government) and clearly define the range of possible actions (substantially increasing economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.) Going into the first tournament of the year, most policy teams have a good idea of what the most common affs will be on the topic, regardless of the resolution’s subject area. That isn’t the case here. Even previous LD resolutions have been much more plan-friendly than this one- all three topics last year were US-specific with clearly defined subject areas. In contrast, this topic has hundreds of possible actors and even more possible policy actions. I'm usually of the opinion that the more plans the better, and that debaters who complain about having to research multiple affs are just being lazy. On this topic, though, even if a squad devoted several hours a day just to research case negs against every possible aff they could think of, they still likely wouldn't have enough prep. [DT] Perhaps plans on this topic should have a specific solvency advocate who specifies both a topical actor and implementation mechanism. Under this view, someone arguing that an extractive industry is harmful wouldn’t be a solvency advocate. For instance, we might think that it’s bad for Iran to mine uranium, but should affs really be allowed to fiat that Iran stop mining? On any other topic this would be object fiat, and the fact that Iran isn’t technically the object anymore doesn’t make the fiat less abusive. [RK] “Must read a solvency advocate” was just one of the ways that debaters attempted to deal with hyper-specific plans at VBT. Other interpretations we heard were “must disclose the plan text before the round even if you haven’t broken it yet” and “must defend action by more than one country.” These theory objections are creative, and I appreciate that squads were trying to avoid the classic “plans bad” debate, but I’m not sure if these interpretations really address the problem with plans. Even if plans are permissible only if they have a solvency advocate, there are still over a thousand possible solvency advocates in the literature. The same problem applies to allowing plans as long as they are disclosed before the debate. The interpretation that debaters must defend more than one country led to somewhat absurd **debates at VBT where the aff defended unrelated actions by two** different **countries**-i.e., two plans at the same time, which obviously **didn’t resolve** the **predictability** problem. [DT] **On the other hand, we shouldn’t** be so quick to **write off all plans** on the topic. A whole-res approach seems to lead to a disingenuous discussion of what developing countries actually should do and makes it confusing to think coherently about offense and solvency. The standard whole-res affirmative at VBT went something along the lines of, “I defend that all countries choose to protect the environment whenever there’s a conflict with resource extraction, so I won’t delink from any disad you run.” While this might seem fine at first (how kind of the aff to let the neg run anything!), is it really that reasonable? First, the whole-res approach seems to either grant debaters automatic solvency or muddle solvency so that it is nearly impossible to compare arguments. There are many ways to restrict resource extraction. Leaving aside questions of topicality, if the aff doesn’t specify whether it imposes a carbon tax on industries that create fossil fuels or bans the industries directly, can the neg indict the tax or the ban or both or neither? If the aff plan were the carbon tax, at least the neg would know what solvency mechanism to indict. If the aff is whole-res, how can the neg indict solvency? Either the neg has no way to do so, since the aff just claims to solve and talks about the harms of extraction, or the neg can do it in any number of contradictory ways because it’s unclear what the aff defends. Neither option seems particularly plausible. Debaters who run framework-heavy affs might think that there’s no reason to specify a solvency mechanism. Who cares about solvency if the aff framework is about intention? Well, from the aff’s perspective, a plan that bans overfishing can turn a food security DA, since sustainable fishing might lead to more food security in the long-run. But without any actual policies specified in the AC, can a whole-res aff turn the DA in the same way by all of a sudden claiming to ban overfishing in the 1AR? Refusing to specify thus impedes aff strategy if the aff framework becomes less relevant later in the debate. Presumably, the aff could run the overfishing plan with any framework; specifying in the AC can give the aff more strategic options later. A potential way to allow for solvency debates under a whole-res approach is to specify various policies under different scenarios, but this still doesn’t address whether the aff can solve for scenarios not in the AC. Second, a **whole-res** advocacy **seems to disadvantage the aff by forcing it to defend radical policies**. Presumably all mining has some potential for conflict with the environment, so would a whole-res aff have ban ALL mining? Does anyone think we should actually do that? Whatever the harms from a deteriorating environment, the massive impact of shutting down all extractive industries tomorrow is presumably worse. Even for debates that don’t focus on a cost-benefit analysis, advocacies that seem to ban all extraction are inconsistent with how actual experts consider these policies. **If**, on the other hand, **the aff doesn’t ban all extraction but** also **doesn’t run a plan, how do we know what the aff is doing and**/or **how strong the links are to** any neg **DAs or Ks?** I’ve heard many affs respond to DA links by saying, “I don’t ban all extraction, only some of it, so your link isn’t that strong.” But isn’t that also true for the neg with environmental protection? And how do we even know what it means to ban some of something without specifying policies? The whole-res approach also forces judges to choose one policy over another when neither policy impedes the other. What does it matter to Chile’s copper extractors or South Sudan’s oil companies whether we should ban overfishing in the Coral Triangle? **An approach that lets debaters** just **compare thousands of policies that aren’t mutually exclusive sidesteps** important **nuances in the lit**erature **and encourages debaters to** just **weigh** random impacts **without engaging each other**’s policies. I’m also not sure how proving that one thing in Chile outweighs another thing in South Sudan without narrowing the topic to those countries actually affirms or negates the resolution. [RK] Finally, plans make a certain group of negative strategies possible. Plan inclusive counterplans, agent counterplans, and disadvantages with specific links do not interact as well against on-balance or philosophical affirmatives. While philosophical debate is well and good, there are also valuable educational benefits from debates involving plans, disads and counterplans. Every debate doesn’t necessarily have to be a comparison of policy options, but debaters should be able to choose whether to engage in that style or not. In conclusion, we are inclined to think that at least some plans should be allowed on this topic, even if it’s hard to draw a clear boundary between which ones should and shouldn’t be read. For example, **plans that** we think **are** more **theoretically legitimate** than others are**: - Plans that deal with a large group of countries, such as** the **Africa**n Union or the Coral Triangle Initiative countries - Plans that deal with a diversity of resource extraction industries rather than just one - Plans that ban extraction and have the effect/intent of protection, but not plans that improve protection but have the effect of less extraction At the very least, it would be ridiculous to require every affirmative to defend the resolution as a general principle in every round. Plans can make the topic more interesting and spark nuanced, deeper discussion about areas of the topic we might otherwise brush over. However, there are good theoretical objections against narrowing the topic down too far. The trick over the next few months will be figuring out a reasonable boundary between plans that should and shouldn’t be allowed.

2. Stable advocacy – clear delineation of countries minimizes aff shiftiness which preserves neg ground.

3. Education – the issues facing Africa, South America, and Asia are distinct, so discussing all of them at once forces us to debate meaningless abstractions about environment rather than specific real world harms.

4. The countries I spec are indicative of the topic as a whole, which means that if his offense doesn’t link to Africa, it probably wasn’t germane to the resolution and it’s not valid neg ground.

5. C’mon. It’s all of Africa.

### Solvency Ext

Environmental protection is key to solve African resource conflicts.

**Aning et al. 11** write[[70]](#footnote-70)

Even though factors underlying conflicts are multi-causal and should be considered as such, **it is high time** realistic **conflict prevention policy** initiatives began to **disaggregate the multiplicity of underlining factors** so as **to properly pre-empt policy orientation**. We have argued that the youth bulge phenomenon, migration and environmental degradation are important perspectives from which security concerns in the sub-region should be confronted. Whilst admitting that the factors do not act alone to underlie the conflict situations in West Africa, it will be regrettable to discount these factors as mere coincidental conceptualisations and deductions that should be relegated to the background in the quest for peace. Together with the various underlying economic, social, political and structural factors in many countries, we have argued that some countries in the sub-region have fallen victim to the effects of a higher young adult population, and the complexities that ensue as the situation becomes concurrent with inadequacy/inequitable distribution of resources, and unpredictable domestic economic and political environment. Similarly, **tensions surrounding** the activities of **environmental refugees**’ especially migrant farmers and pastoralists in the forest belt **highlight the critical role of the environment in the security of West Africa.** It is, therefore, important that in addition to the many peace initiatives in West Africa, the following policy options are given vital consideration:  Factors and processes that have the capacity of impacting on the demographic composition of states and further contribute to a skewed demographic composition in favour of young adults must be confronted with utmost urgency in the sub-region. This is because such factors have the capacity to worsen the demographic composition of states creating a youth bulge and its associated complexities. An important factor in this regard is the HIV/AIDS pandemic which has the capacity to distort sub-regional demography by increasing the proportion of the already large young adult population through reduction in life expectancy. The fight against HIV/AIDS could therefore be securitised both nationally and subregionally. This will positively affect the commitment of states in terms of resource allocation and political will to implement formulated policies.  Policies that target young adults should be consciously crafted so as not to create discomfort and dissatisfaction that make young people vulnerable to political manipulation by desperate individuals who may want to exploit their desperate situations to foment unrests. In this direction efforts should be made to answer (address?) the chronic unemployment and the generally uncertain future that lies ahead of young adults. Youth development programmes should be made inseparable parts of DDR processes so as to sustain peace and also prevent youth-led implosion and re-ignition of conflicts. Specific intervention efforts should target training and job creation, and entrepreneurship promotion among young people.  **Environmental protection** policies **should be an important part of national and** sub**regional security strategies.** Presently, **ECOWAS** does not have an environmental policy for member states. Even though it is being drafted at the time of writing this paper, the document **does not clearly outline** sub-regional **strategies for managing trans-boundary resources** such as water. ECOWAS, through an environmental policy document, should clearly establish guidelines for inter-state collaboration in the usage of trans-boundary resources **as a proactive way of preventing resource-based inter-state tensions** in West Africa. Countries that share a particular environment-dependent resource (such as water in the case of Ghana and Burkina) should be encouraged to collaboratively craft mechanisms for their peaceful use.

### South Sudan UQ

South Sudan doesn’t prioritize environmental protection now.

**URN 13** writes[[71]](#footnote-71)

As oil steadily flows in **South Sudan**, the country **has not yet passed legislation on** the management and **protection of the environment from** damage by **oil** production-**related activities**. Oil production was shut down for about 14 months from 2011, due to disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan governments. Production in South Sudan resumed in April 2013, but the Environment Management and Protection Bill 2013 has yet to be tabled in parliament. Unity State, which Uganda Radio Network visited, is yet to form a law to protect the environment. The state has 5 oil fields, the largest being Unity Oil Field, with 126 wells. **The national** legislative **assembly**’s Specialised Committee on Land, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment **carried out visits to** Palouch, Unity, Manga, Toma South and Toor **Oil Fields** in Unity and Upper Nile States in July 2013, **and discovered gross damage to the environment**. The committee report’s findings indicate that in Palouch, Upper Nile State, **around 100 hectares of forest were destroyed by contaminated water** between 2000 and 2008. The report also shows a photograph of a dead bird, submerged in a contaminated pond in Toma South Oil Field in Unity State. According to the report, **oil companies take advantage of** the lack of access roads to most areas, and the **inadequacy of liquid waste treatment facilities to cut costs, and are not keen on** proper **environmental protection measures**. The committee also found that oil leakages had mostly affected Manga, Toma South, Toor and Naar, caused by vandalism during the war between Khartoum and Juba. In some areas, pipelines had been fractured by pressure resulting from unexpected shut-down in February 2011. Some of this damage to environment dates back to the 1990s when Sudan was still one country, but since the committee’s findings were published in July 2013, no measures have been taken. William Garjang, a geologist and the Chairman of Unity State Oil Task Force, says that in 2010, tests discovered lead and other heavy metals in the water consumed by the communities, but these places are still used as water sources.

### Accountability Scenario

Resource extraction and conflict in Africa kills accountability.

**OSAA 6** writes[[72]](#footnote-72)

The presenter, Mr. Alex Vines, stated that internal armed conflict in resource-rich countries is a major cause of human rights violation around the world and availability of portable, high-value resources is an important reason behind the formation of rebel groups and the outbreak of civil wars. He stated that the “greed vs. grievance” theory of conflict is distorted by an overemphasis on the impact of resources on rebel group behavior and insufficient attention to how **government mismanagement of resource and revenue fuel conflict and human rights abuses.** If the international community is serious about curbing conflict–related abuses in resource-rich countries, it should insist on greater transparency in government revenues and expenditures and on punitive measures against **governments** that **seek to profit from conflict**. Too often government **control of** important **resources and** the **revenues** that flow from these resources **go hand in hand with** a culture of **impunity**, lack of respect for the rule of law **and inequitable distribution** of public resources. These factors often lead to governments with unaccountable power that routinely commit human rights abuse. They can also make prolonged armed conflict more likely. **Control over resources gives** such **governments a strong incentive to maintain power even at the expense of public welfare and** the **rights** of the population. He pointed out that **in many resource-rich countries, governments are** abusive, **unaccountable and corrupt** and often grossly mismanage the economy. Unaccountable governments with large revenue streams at their disposal have multiple opportunities to divert funds for illegal purposes. When such governments are involved in armed conflicts, the resulting human rights abuses can be horrific.

Lack of accountability kills post-conflict international donations to revive African health sectors.

**Reuters 13** writes[[73]](#footnote-73)

FREETOWN, Dec 20 (Reuters) - **A vaccination provider** set up **with money from the** Bill and Melinda **Gates Foundation has put on hold** some **$6 million** earmarked **for Sierra Leone after an audit showed misuse of previous funds**, a document seen by Reuters showed. The leaked letter from the GAVI Alliance dated Nov. 15 2012 and addressed to Sierra Leone's health minister says an in-depth audit revealed "serious concerns of misuse of GAVI funds" totalling $1,099,640. **The GAVI Alliance**, which **aims to improve access to immunisation in the world's poorest countries**, was launched in 2000 with a $750 million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It has disbursed more than $27 million to Sierra Leone's government since 2001. Sierra Leone's acting Health Minister Tamba Borbor-Sawyer denied the GAVI letter was proof of foul play. "The content of that document doesn't say the GAVI money has been defrauded ... It points out certain areas where there could have been some malfeasance," said Borbor-Sawyer, who took over management of the ministry earlier this year. **A GAVI spokesman said** the irregularities, which included **undocumented expenses, cash disbursements with no documentation and overcharge**dprocurement costs, **occurred** from 2008 to 2011. As a result, the organisation froze the last disbursement of a current grant, worth $530,750, as well as a new two-year grant of $5,399,371 currently under final consideration. Sierra Leone's government must now commit to reimbursing the misused funds and those found responsible for abuses must face administrative or legal proceedings before the grants will be unfrozen, the letter said. **After Sierra Leone's** 1991-2002 **civil war the** West African **state had some of the world's worst health statistics.** In response **donors poured in funds**, in particular underwriting the introduction in 2010 of free healthcare for pregnant and nursing mothers, and children under five. **But allegations of corruption** have **dogged such efforts. A 2011 investigation** into the free healthcare programme by human rights campaigner Amnesty International **highlighted** what it said was **an "absence of** any effective monitoring and **accountability** systems".

Disease from displacement spills over across Africa.

**Hoeffler 8** writes[[74]](#footnote-74)

In contrast to death figures, internationally comparable data for displaced persons are easy to obtain. **The U**nited **N**ations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) **collects** and publishes **worldwide data**. In 2006 the UNHCR listed **about** 33 million people of concern globally. These people of concern are defined in three broad categories, about 10 million refugees, 13 million **internally displaced persons** (IDPs) and about 10 million others (asylum seekers, returned refugees/IDPs and stateless persons). Figure 1 graphs the number of persons of concern for the past 20 years. Since 2000 the number of refugees has fallen from 12.1 million to 9.9 million worldwide. However, **the total number of IDPs** and others of concern **has been rising sharply** since 2002. This number rose from 10.3 million in 2002 to 23 million in 2006. How does Africa compare to the rest of the world? Africa is only home to about 12 percent of the world’s population. However, **31 percent of the world’s refugee population originate from Africa.** Most African refugees come from the following countries: Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Burundi, Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Western Sahara and Ethiopia. Table 2 lists refugee numbers for these countries. Refugees from these countries make up about 28 percent of the world’s refugees. Where do these refugees flee to? **Most of these refugees flee across the border to neighbouring states,** i.e. **they do not leave the continent**. The main host countries are Tanzania, Chad, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia, Algeria and Congo. The refugee numbers by country of asylum are listed in Table 3. What about the other large group of ‘people of concern’, the IDPs? A staggering **42 percent of** the **global IDPs were displaced in nine African countries**: Uganda, Sudan, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, CAR, Chad, Burundi and Congo. Table 4 provides the figures for IDPs in Africa. Displacement often has terrible consequences. **IDPs are at high risk from violence, malnutrition and communicable diseases.** A survey carried out in the Republic of Congo found that morality rates between November 1999 and January 2000 was more than 5 per 10,000 and that malnutrition was the principal cause of death among the displaced. A third of all children in one camp in Brazzaville had global acute malnutrition. Médcins Sans Frontières treated more than 10,000 cases of acute malnutrition.7 To summarize, the regional cost of conflict are very high in Africa. **Although the continent is only home to** about **12 percent of the world**’s population **it has a very high share of global human misery.** About 31 percent of the world’s refugees originate from and find asylum in Africa and about 42 percent of the world’s IDPs live in African countries.

### Rule of Law Link

Resource conflict in Africa kills rule of law, accountability, and human rights.

**OSAA 6** writes[[75]](#footnote-75)

The presenter, Mr. Alex Vines, stated that **internal armed conflict in resource-rich countries is a major cause of human rights violation** around the world and availability of portable, high-value resources is an important reason behind the formation of rebel groups and the outbreak of civil wars. He stated that the “greed vs. grievance” theory of conflict is distorted by an overemphasis on the impact of resources on rebel group behavior and insufficient attention to how **government mismanagement of resource and revenue fuel conflict and human rights abuses.** If the international community is serious about curbing conflict–related abuses in resource-rich countries, it should insist on greater transparency in government revenues and expenditures and on punitive measures against **governments** that **seek to profit from conflict**. Too often government **control of** important **resources and** the **revenues** that flow from these resources **go hand in hand with** a culture of **impunity, lack of respect for** the **rule of law and inequitable distribution** of public resources. These factors often lead to **governments with unaccountable power** that **routinely commit human rights abuse.** They can also make prolonged armed conflict more likely. **Control over resources gives** such **governments a strong incentive to maintain power even at the expense of public welfare and** the **rights** of the population. He pointed out that **in many resource-rich countries, governments are** abusive, **unaccountable and corrupt** and often grossly mismanage the economy. Unaccountable governments with large revenue streams at their disposal have multiple opportunities to divert funds for illegal purposes. When such governments are involved in armed conflicts, the resulting human rights abuses can be horrific.

### Extra Card

Seems useful

**OSAA 6** writes[[76]](#footnote-76)

In his presentation, Mr. John Dos Santos Rocha noted that **despite being endowed with** some of **the most sought after** natural **resources in the world, Africa has** in the past **failed to transform its** enormous **economic potential** and wealth **into tangible benefits in terms of** human **security,** sustainable peace **and development.** At the same time, there has emerged within Africa, a recognition that the governance of natural resources occupies the nexus between peace, stability and socio-economic development. This recognition underpins the new vision for Africa’s growth and renewal embodied in the African Union (AU) and its socio-economic development framework, NEPAD. This vision is further reinforced by **the multi-dimensional notion of human security** implicit in the common African Defence and Security Policy7, which **links traditional state security** and individual safety **with** the protection of socio-economic rights, such as access to resources and **protection against** poverty and **environmental degradation.** Mr. Rocha noted that **African leaders have recognized that the manner in which the continent’s resources are managed and exploited was fundamental to** their ability to enhance both state and human security, contribute to **sustainable development** and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Consequently, natural resources governance should fall under the purview of the lead actors in the vision, namely the African Union and the African regional economic communities. Mr. Rocha argued that **conflict in one country has implications for other countries and** indeed **the continent as a whole**. He suggested that in order to break the link between access to and control and exploitation of resources on the one hand and instability or insecurity and war on the other hand, there was a need to move away from the narrow perspective that only looks at the implication of exploitation and management of natural resources for areas affected by conflict to a new security dimension that puts Africa’s natural resources at the centre of national, regional and continental security policies.

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